Crafting Redistribution: Unarmed Civilians and Land Reform in Civil War Bargaining*

Isabel Güiza-Gómez†

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Online Appendix

Why is land redistribution enshrined in civil war peace settlements? I argue that peace processes provide critical opportunities for redistribution when unarmed, rural movements deploy mobilization strength to influence bargaining. When movements sustain contention and credibly assert autonomy from warring factions, they reshape the fixed, competing preferences of warring parties, rendering reform urgent and legitimate. Movements shape redistributive commitments through two mechanisms: *crisis credibility*—raising the costs of elite resistance—and *moral credibility*—folding reform as a civilian mandate. Using the 2012-2016 Colombian peace talks as a case, I show how rural movements deployed their organizational and moral resources to compel the warring factions to incorporate land reform into the 2016 agreement. To assess internal validity, I estimate variation in negotiation outcomes employing natural language processing (e.g., text similarity between citizen proposals and peace provisions) and regression models. These findings highlight the crucial role of unarmed civilians in resolving conflict-related inequalities.

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†Center for Inter-American Policy and Research, Tulane University. Contact: iguizagomez@tulane.edu

1 Introduction

Civil war often exacerbates deep-seated inequalities, casting civilians in an ever-growing pool of dispossessed communities. Amid uncertainty and coercion, armed actors, state officials, and economic elites forcibly strip poor communities of their homes and land (Tellez, 2022; Cramer and Wood, 2017). However, as war draws to an end, peace negotiations have increasingly become crucial instances for addressing such inequalities, particularly in land ownership and resource management. Figure 1 shows that, from 1991 to 2022, 40 out of 79 peace settlements—ranging from comprehensive peace agreements to post-conflict conflict constitutions—addressed land reform. These dispositions targeted issues such as land ownership, agricultural support services for the rural poor, and property returns (Bell and Badanjak, 2019). In contrast to land expropriation, which served as the flagship mechanism of twentieth-century reform, land reform in peace settlements often involves transfers of land ownership from large landholders to landless peasants through state-sponsored compensation and financing (Keels and Mason, 2019).

Figure 1: Civil War Peace Agreement Provisions on Land Reform (1991-2022)



Note: Countries colored in green record at least one peace agreement or post-conflict constitution, while countries with patterned shading include at least one provision on land reform.

This trend challenges the conventional wisdom that economic redistribution is often sidelined in civil war bargaining (Doyle, 2012; Richmond, 2006). Canonical political tran-

sition theory argues that the opposition may push for both political incorporation and wealth redistribution, while incumbent parties are generally more willing to grant costly concessions on political incorporation—such as competitive elections, power-sharing arrangements, or civil liberties—insofar as the existing distribution of wealth remains untouched (O'Donnell et al., 1986). This challenge becomes even more pronounced when elites control fixed assets because landed elites will only acquiesce to democratization if they believe their property will be well-protected under democratic rule (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Ansell and Samuels, 2010; Boix, 2003; Ziblatt, 2008). Civil war bargaining compounds such distributive conflict among warring sides, who quickly enter gridlock. While revolutionary insurgents are unlikely to forgo redistribution as a core demand at bargaining tables—that are central to their ideological program and postwar electoral calculations—the government has limited concession capacity over issues that jeopardize elite support sustaining political stability (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2025; Sticher, 2021). Thus, the theoretical expectation states that redistribution should be the least likely outcome of civil war peace negotiations. However, the empirical record runs counter to this theoretical expectation. *Why is land redistribution enshrined in civil war peace settlements?*

In this article, I develop and test a bargaining theory of land redistribution in civil war peace processes. In contexts marked by massive violence, I argue that *non-belligerent*, organized civilians drive the inclusion of land reform commitments into peace settlements amid negotiation deadlocks among the warring sides. I focus on rural social movements—including peasant, Indigenous, and Afro-descendant organizations—who are often at the forefront of unarmed opposition during the war. When endowed with mobilization strength—or the degree to which they sustain contention (organizational capacity) and credibly assert autonomy from armed groups (distancing capacity)—rural movements reshape the fixed, competing preferences of negotiating parties toward a shared compromise on redistribution. Rural movements with mobilization strength render redistribution as an admissible concession for conflict resolution by activating two mechanisms. First, through crisis credibility, these actors impose material costs on elite resistance, altering

the strategic calculus of warring parties who believe that reform is an urgent response. Second, through moral credibility, movements recast land redistribution as a legitimate civilian imperative rather than a rebel concession.

To test the observable implications of my argument, I examine the 2012-2016 Colombian peace negotiation between the Santos moderate administration and the revolutionary guerrilla group FARC-EP (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo*). Colombia represents a least-likely case for land redistribution in civil war peace settlements, as the country underwent one of the most protracted civil wars in the Western Hemisphere, wherein land inequality was central to armed confrontation (Lopez-Uribe and Sanchez Torres, 2024). I employ process tracing to track down the causal pathway linking negotiation deadlock over land redistribution and the inclusion of redistributive commitments into the 2016 peace accord. I integrate qualitative and quantitative causal-process observations (CPOs) embedded in an analytical narrative to assess the main argument against the alternative hypotheses of elite concession and rebel extraction. Qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews and archival sources allow me to identify pivotal events in the causal chain, elucidate the causal mechanisms, and address alternative arguments. Quantitative methods help me evaluate internal validity by estimating variation in outcomes within the peace negotiation through natural language processing and regression models.

Particularly, I estimate statistical correlations between the type of civilian organizations that submitted petitions to the Havana peace table and the degree of similarity between citizens proposals and land provisions in the 2016 agreement. Building on political science computational studies (Lin, 2025), I apply a Sentence-BERT (SBERT) model to capture semantic similarity—that is, whether words used in citizen petitions and the peace agreement convey similar meaning—and a Bag-of-Words (BoW) model to measure lexical similarity—or word overlap between these documents. While BoW models are widely used in computational political science for measuring text alignment (Garrett and Jansa, 2015; Hazelton and Hinkle, 2022; Ash et al., 2024; Hager and Hilbig, 2020; Blumenau, 2019; Carlson, 2019), SBERT is increasingly used to extract meaning in political

texts (Bestvater and Monroe, 2022; Widmann and Wich, 2022; Licht, 2023). My data collection includes a novel dataset recording 8,238 civilian petitions submitted to the Havana peace table, negotiation records, protest agreements signed between movements and the government, as well as 48 in-depth interviews with government and insurgent negotiators and social movement representatives collected during 16 months of fieldwork. The original dataset on citizen proposals provides a robust proxy of rural mobilization for land redistribution during peace negotiations in Colombia.

The combined evidence supports the argument that rural movements shape land commitments in peace settlements. I show how the Santos government and FARC-EP entered negotiation deadlock over land reform at the Havana peace table. Then, I demonstrate why and how rural movements allowed the warring factions to overcome gridlock by raising the costs of ignoring land claims and bolstering legitimacy for redistribution. Moreover, I find that rural mobilization—measured as at least one movement per citizen proposal or the proportion of movement signatories—is associated with higher similarity scores between citizen petitions and the agreement's land dispositions at a statistically significant level. These results remain robust to alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable and robustness checks. Finally, I demonstrate that variation in mobilization strength offers a more compelling explanation than the alternative hypotheses of elite concession and rebel extraction.

The bargaining theory of land redistribution developed in this article contributes to scholarship on conflict resolution, non-violent collective action, and the political economy of redistribution. Building on growing research on civilian agency in civil wars (Good, 2024; Berman et al., 2023; Arjona, 2016; Kaplan, 2017), I bring non-armed social movements to the center of war termination explanations. Rather than treating civilians as passive victims or secondary actors subordinate to warring factions and international organizations (Fearon, 1995; Findley, 2013; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Walter, 2021), I demonstrate that organized civilian communities set the terms of agreement over the contested issues that underpin prospects for conflict resolution. I further show that unarmed civilians shape negotiation outcomes regardless of their formal standing at the bargaining

table, contributing to conflict resolution research that has thus far focused primarily on how civilians come to participate formally in peace negotiations (Nilsson et al., 2020; Paffenholz, 2014; Nilsson and Svensson, 2023).

I also specify the causal mechanisms through which unarmed social mobilization affects redistributive outcomes in civil war settlements. Through qualitative and quantitative evidence, I demonstrate that non-belligerent mobilization creates material disruption that shifts elite obstruction by imposing a credible threat to economic activity in contested territory. Civilian organizations simultaneously leverage their moral authority as non-warring actors to compel armed signatories to compromise on reform. In doing so, I extend prior research on nonviolent collective action by examining how peaceful social mobilization shapes redistributive reform—rather than regime change—in the context of civil wars rather than authoritarian regimes (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2013; Gause, 2022; Kadivar and Ketchley, 2018; Amat and Trilling, 2025).

Finally, I identify civil war peace processes as a distinct, yet underexplored pathway to redistribution, alongside revolutions, authoritarian regimes, and democratizing states (Albertus, 2015; Boone, 2014; Lapp, 2004; DeMare, 2019). Peace processes generate the conditions under which unarmed civilians can reconfigure property relations despite the constraints of protracted armed conflict. I therefore shift analytical focus away from military and political elites—the primary agents in existing redistribution scholarship—toward landless communities, who drive redistributive reform through their organizational resources and moral legitimacy .

2 A Bargaining Theory of Land Redistribution: The Role of Rural Mobilization Strength

Land inequality operates both a driver and a consequence of civil war. Disputes over land access and use serve as a catalyst for rebellion and rural-poor mobilization (Mitchell, 1968; Wood, 2003). In turn, armed confrontation exacerbates land inequality, leading to a growing number of dispossessed peasants and widespread grievances (Cramer and

Richards, 2011). Under such circumstances, land becomes a central issue in peace negotiation, as addressing these grievances is essential for resolving the underlying sources of conflict (Keels and Mason, 2019). *Why is land redistribution enshrined in civil war peace settlements?*

I argue that the strength of *unarmed opposition collective action* compels warring parties to compromise on land redistribution in civil war peace settlements.[1] I define unarmed opposition as the collective action of *non-elite* civilians, who do not engage in insurgent action, but instead rely on their organizational and moral resources to mobilize their claims under the high-risk circumstances of civil war.[2] In contrast to elites, these actors draw on dense networks of activism rather than wealth or institutional access. Unlike armed groups, they do not wield the power of weapons; instead they claim moral authority as civilians who have borne the brunt of conflict. Crucially, unarmed opposition actors are not merely social or political wings of insurgent organizations. While they may at times share agendas with armed groups, these civilians choose nonviolent collective action as their mode of contention.

Unarmed opposition actors involve a wide range of civilian organizations—such as labor unions, faith-based communities, neighborhood or shantytown associations, and social movements—and minor political parties who challenge exclusion and inequality in civil wars. Rural movements are often at the frontline of unarmed opposition, as the rural poor are disproportionately exposed to dispossession. Despite differences in their standpoints–such as race or ethnicity—these movements share a common plight: the lack of land ownership necessary for securing their livelihoods, preserving cultural practices, and exercising political autonomy.

[1]Drawing on prior political economy scholarship (Albertus, 2015; Borras, Saturnino, 2012), I understand land redistribution as a specific form of land reform, which extracts land from prior holders—whether formally titled owners or *de facto* claimants—to poor populations. It encompasses expropriation of large estates to provide land for smallholders, the reallocation of contested public land for marginalized communities, and subsidized sales of private land.

[2]I choose not to employ the term "civil society," which is commonly used in the literature on civilian mobilization in peace processes (Paffenholz, 2014; Nilsson and Svensson, 2023; Haass et al., 2022). This label collapses diverse civilian organizations with starkly different financial capacity, prestige, and territorial presence—such as political parties, NGOs, think tanks, business associations, and social movements—into a single category.

I posit that peace negotiations create the initial conditions for redistribution. As shifts in coercive power among warring sides, these negotiations recalibrate government preferences and weaken the veto power of recalcitrant factions resistant to economic reform. Moreover, they often introduce novel institutions—such as public forums, citizen assemblies, or constitutional conventions—that expand political space for formerly excluded actors and their suppressed demands (García-Montoya, Güiza-Gómez, and Saffon, 2025). Peace negotiations usually involve two warring factions, who hold competing redistributive preferences. Moderate elites—often center-right or center-left governments—view peacemaking primarily as a vehicle for market integration rather than redistribution (Chakma, 2024). In contrast, revolutionary insurgents—who are committed to overthrowing previous orders (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2025, p. 5)—advocate for radical wealth redistribution. Their maximalist preferences are rooted in both ideological and instrumental concerns. First, highly committed insurgents often prioritize deontological reasons over strategic calculation when determining the terms of the agreement (Ginges and Atran, 2011). Second, rebel leaders perceive land reform as a potential victory they can claim credit for in post-settlement elections in which organizational survival stands a priority (Matanock, 2017).

Negotiation over land redistribution begins when revolutionary insurgents introduce land reform as a bargaining issue. Yet, rebels cannot unilaterally force the government to concede. Moderate elites face strong incentives to resist redistributive policies, which threaten rather than advance the interests of their core constituencies (Joshi and Quinn, 2015). Business firms and landowning elites, in particular, constrain the government's bargaining capacity to make concessions that would jeopardize their wealth, even when doing so might facilitate a settlement (Fernández Milmanda, 2024).

In response, insurgents seek to overcome such resistance by demonstrating military might on the battlefield. Escalated guerrilla operations signal both their capacity to prolong war and the risks of excluding redistribution from the settlement agenda (Leventoğlu and Metternich, 2018). While insurgent attacks may persuade economic elites and the government to see concessions as a less costly option compared to armed confronta-

tion, they also cast doubt on the government's ability to provide stability. Prolonged violence risks framing concessions as capitulation to insurgency, heightening elite opposition (Crisman-Cox, 2022; Sticher, 2021). Therefore, insurgents find themselves in a bind: while continued combat strengthens their bargaining position on incompatible demands central to their political program and support base, it simultaneously constrains the government's concession capacity.

I argue that rural social movements with mobilization strength allow warring parties to overcome such redistributive gridlock. Rural movements are uniquely positioned to influence peace bargaining. Rooted in the daily grievances of the rural poor, these actors organize collective action from local networks and scale local contention outward through occupations, protests, and blockades (Thurber, 2021; Della Porta, 2014; Rossi, 2017). As local actors, movements also bridge constituencies dispersed by war, turning scattered grievances into collective demands that carry weight at the negotiating table (Brockett, 2005; Scott, 1992).

Mobilization strength constitutes a key property for rural movements to shape the fixed and competing preferences of government and insurgents toward redistribution. I understand mobilization strength along two dimensions: organizational capacity and distancing capacity. Mobilization strength requires a baseline of both capacities. Movements that fail in either dimension lack the organizational and credibility endurance to influence peace negotiations. Organizational capacity refers to a movement's ability to mount multiple mobilization events—such as protest, demonstrations, or petitions—that span geographical areas and target centers of political or economic power (Collier and Collier, 2002, p. 67) (Tarrow, 2022; Tilly, 2008). Rural movements demonstrate high organizational capacity when they launch several actions in locations central to government authority and economic development, even if these events are geographically clustered. Conversely, movements are weak on this dimension when their actions are sporadic and confined to areas outside the reach of state or capital.

Distancing capacity refers to a movements' ability to *credibly* organize as autonomous

from the infrastructure and claim-making of armed actors.[3] I suggest that distancing capacity extends beyond than mere condemnation of rebel violence. It involves maintaining independent leadership, networks, resource flows, and holding civilian demands distinct from rebel agendas. Movements exhibit high distancing capacity when both infrastructure independence and claim-making differentiation are present. A movement cannot credibly claim autonomy from armed factions if it couches demands in democratic framings but continues to operate within insurgent networks.

Movements with mobilization strength resolve the distributional deadlock by reshaping the distributive preferences of both warring factions. Positioned outside the logic of armed confrontation, movements serve as informational conduits toward both warring factions who are filled with mistrust and lack accurate knowledge of rural grievances after years of armed confrontation. Movements also introduce new policy agendas that neither the government nor insurgents initially prioritize, expanding the range of concessions. On this basis, movements shift fixed, competing preferences among the negotiating parties toward a shared willingness to include redistribution in the settlement. By tempering rebel maximalist agendas and expanding government minimalist preferences, movements carve out consensus for a shared commitment to reconfiguring property relations.

I posit that two causal mechanisms connect the strength of rural mobilization to the inclusion of land redistribution commitments in peace settlements: crisis credibility and moral credibility (See Figure 2). Crisis credibility arises when sustained mobilization renders land redistribution urgent for reaching a negotiated settlement. Unlike insurgents, who extract concessions through military threats, rural movements draw on organizational capacity to deploy unarmed strategies, including strikes, land occupations, and protests. These disruptions raise the costs of resistance for governments and business elites, who come to see land reform as the least costly path to stability (Uba, 2005; Garay, 2016). At the same time, mobilization provides external validation for insurgents' redistributive claims, strengthening their bargaining position. Ultimately, crisis credibility shifts the costs of sidelining redistribution from negotiated settlement.

[3]This notion draws upon Bermeo (2003)'s argument that democratic regimes are more vulnerable to collapse when moderate elites fail to distance themselves from extremist leaders.



Figure 2: Bargaining over Redistribution: Commitment Arena

Moral credibility emerges when rural mobilization demonstrates that land redistribution is a legitimate demand of autonomous civilians rather than a concession coerced by armed actors. For insurgents, this civilian mandate allows them to fold redistribution into their negotiation agenda without appearing to bargain solely for organizational survival. For governments, it provides political cover to grant concessions without appearing weak or complicit. In sharp contrast to armed groups, unarmed movements often enjoy broader moral legitimacy, particularly among aggrieved rural populations and sympathetic urban constituencies (Chenoweth and Schock, 2015). This second mechanism affords political legitimacy for redistribution, widening the scope for agreement.

Based on the foregoing discussion, I expect that:

H1. Rural social movements compel both warring factions and elites to commit to land redistribution in peace settlements when they demonstrate mobilization strength.

H1a. When rural movements sustain collective action, they raise the costs of resistance and make land redistribution an urgent concession for negotiated settlement (crisis credibility).

H1b. When rural movements mobilize as autonomous civilians with broad-based demands, they confer legitimacy on redistribution and widen the bargaining space for

both governments and insurgents (moral credibility).

This argument assumes a baseline capacity for rural mobilization under conditions of civil war. Yet this capacity is not uniformly present across all conflicts. In wars where repression escalates to genocidal violence, civilian agency is often decimated, rendering movements devoid of leadership, networks, or territorial bases. Under such extreme conditions, the rural poor face significant barriers to reconstituting collective action and influencing negotiations (Stoll, 1994; Beswick, 2010, 2013). Even when rural mobilization persists the war, movements often confront severe stigmatization, particularly in contexts where elites collapse peaceful tactics and legitimate claims into rebellion—as observed during Cold War-era civil wars (Carroll, 2011). In such radicalized environments, distancing capacity becomes key to signaling civilian agency and thus building legitimacy at the negotiating table.

3 Empirical Case: the 2012-2016 Peace Negotiation in Colombia

To test the observable implications of my argument, I examine the 2012-2016 peace negotiation between the moderate government of Juan Manuel Santos and the guerrilla group FARC-EP. Colombia constitutes a least-likely case for land redistribution in civil war peace settlements. The country experienced one of the most protracted civil wars in the Western Hemisphere, wherein land inequality was central to armed confrontation. Revolutionary guerrilla groups allegedly took up arms in response to elite obstruction to land reform in the 1960s (Daly, 2012; Pizarro Leongómez, 2011). In wartime, paramilitary groups, state forces, and rebel groups repressed civilians and dispossessed peasants of their land (Bandiera, 2021; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010) Particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, approximately 8.3 million hectares of land—roughly twice the size of Belgium—were forcibly taken from peasants (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 76). Prior to and during wartime, peasant, Indigenous, and Afro-descendant movements engaged in peaceful collective action to resist dispossession and demand land redistribution (Zamosc,

1986; García-Montoya, Güiza-Gómez, and Chang, 2025). By design, Colombia provides a hard test of my argument: if rural social movements can shape warring factions' commitments to redistribution under these inhospitable conditions, the argument plausibly extends beyond this case.

The Havana peace talks unfolded from 2012 to 2016, where land inequality emerged as a central bargaining issue from the outset. During peace negotiation, rural movements advanced their land demands through protest activity and formal engagement with the peace table. Key protest events included the 2013 nationwide agrarian strike and the 2013 and 2014 demonstrations in coca-growing areas (Cruz Rodríguez, 2017). At the Havana table, these movements actively participated in proposal-making forums and consultation meetings, which were established to gather citizen input from a diverse array of actors, such as social movements, business groups, NGOs, and political parties. Proposal-making forums entailed state-sanctioned, nationwide meetings facilitated by nonpartisan actors like the United Nations Development Program and Universidad Nacional de Colombia. To minimize citizen co-optation, neither Santos' administration nor FARC-EP could participate in these forums (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz - Presidencia de la República, 2018, p. 46). Consultation meetings invited external actors to offer in-depth insights given their technical or first-hand expertise and academic work (Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz - Presidencia de la República, 2018, p. 45-46) (interviews 20, 29, 26, 47). Nonetheless, these participatory spaces were non-binding for the signatories.

On August 26, 2016, the warring factions signed a comprehensive peace agreement, which includes three cornerstone land reform mechanisms. First, the accord established a land fund aimed at granting poor peasants farmland property rights free of charge, which contrasts with other land mechanisms outlined in peace accords, such as the Guatemalan land fund that allocated land through credits (Granovsky-Larsen, 2019). This fund reallocates 3 million hectares of land from private owners who had unlawfully acquired property to landless peasants. It also formalizes property rights for 7 million hectares already occupied by small-scale farmers. A key component of land reform is the crop substitution program for coca-growing peasants, offering land property rights, agricultural services,

and cash transfers to support peasants in ceasing coca cultivation. Unlike previous programs that forcibly eradicated crops, this initiative encourages peasants to voluntarily cease coca cultivation through participatory institutions at the local level. Second, state agricultural services encompass housing, technical assistance, public infrastructure, and credit for land reform beneficiaries. Third, the peace accord boosts the 2011 land restitution program aimed at recovering property rights and use over dispossessed land by strengthening agricultural service and return programs for victims of forced displacement and dispossession.

4 Research Design

I employ process tracing to track down the causal chain connecting negotiation deadlock over land redistribution and the inclusion of redistributive commitments into the 2016 peace agreement. To elucidate such pathway, I integrate qualitative and quantitative causal-process observations (CPOs), which are embedded in an analytic narrative (Collier et al., 2004). Through qualitative CPOs, I first trace how the negotiating parties entered deadlocks over redistributive reform and rural movements allowed them to reach compromise; then I evaluate two main alternative explanations. Using quantitative CPOs, I estimate whether rural movement proposals were incorporated into the final peace agreement on a systematic basis, thereby assessing the internal validity of my argument. Table 1 lays out key qualitative and quantitative pieces of evidence (CPOs).

My data repertoire includes in-depth interviews, novel negotiation archives, and an original dataset on citizen proposals sent to the peace table, which were collected over four fieldwork waves between 2021 and 2023. I conducted 48 interviews with government and FARC negotiators, advisors to each negotiating team, and movement leaders, who directly participated in negotiation to varying degrees. Archival materials include peace negotiation records, rural movements' demands, and protest agreements, which were retrieved from open-source digital archives and fieldwork collection. More details on recruitment strategies, interview questionnaires, coding, and saturation can be found in

Table 1: Causal-Process Observations In Colombia's Peace Bargaining of Land Redistribution

CPO	Evidence	Description	Likelihood under Main Hypothesis	Likelihood under Elite-Concession Hypothesis	Likelihood under Rebel-Extraction Hypothesis	Test
1	Emergence of Negotiation Deadlock over Land Redistribution	While the Santos government pursued non-redistributive land policies, FARC-EP took a maximalist stance (Interviews 5, 17, 20, 22, 23, 26, 29, 30, 46; negotiation records).	Likely	Likely	Likely	Straw-in-the-Wind
2	Rural Movements as Enablers of Commitment	Movements performed as information conduits and agenda-setters (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 16, 17, 20, 23, 29, 46, 47; negotiation records).	Highly Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Smoking Gun
3	Crisis Credibility	Movements raised the costs of resistance to redistribution (Interviews 5, 20, 29, 30; news coverage)	Highly Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Smoking Gun
4	Moral Credibility	Movements increased the legitimacy of redistributive demands at the table (Interviews 5, 9, 15, 23).	Highly Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Smoking Gun
5	Alignment of Rural Demands with Land Reform Provisions	Proposals endorsed by rural movements exhibit higher semantic alignment with the agreement's land provisions (OLS and NLP analyses in Table 2).	Highly Likely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Hoop
6	Variation in the Effects of Rural Mobilization	Under similar conditions, coca-growing peasant movements succeed in compelling the signatories to address their demands, while, other movements failed to force the negotiating parties to include communal property demands (interviews 2, 4, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48; negotiation archives; news coverage).	Highly Likely	Highly Unlikely	Highly Unlikely	Doubly-Decisive

Online Appendix Section 1.

The dataset documents civilian organization proposals submitted to the Havana peace table through participatory fora between 2012 and 2016. Taking advantage of a comprehensive dataset that records proposals submitted to the Havana peace table, I constructed a novel database disaggregating 8,238 rural-related proposals from 1,390 collective petitioners. This dataset codes organization profiles, represented constituencies, issue classification across the peace agenda, and geographic scope of each.

Using such original dataset, I estimate correlations between the type of civilian organizations that submitted petitions to the Havana peace table and the degree of similarity between citizen proposals and land provisions in the 2016 agreement. Quantitative analysis allows me to assess internal validity by estimating variation in outcomes within the peace negotiation process. The dependent variable is the inclusion of commitments—or concrete, executable dispositions—on land redistribution in the 2016 peace settlement. To operationalize this outcome, I measure the degree of similarity between each citizen proposal and land-related provisions in the peace agreement, using both semantic and lexical similarity metrics. I apply a Sentence-BERT (SBERT) model to capture deeper semantic relationships between proposals and agreement content (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019). SBERT generates contextual embeddings by encoding dense vector representations that reflect sentence meaning accounting for both word order and surrounding context. In my dataset, SBERT similarity scores range from 0.137 to 0.769, with a mean of 0.453. Alternatively, I implement a Bag-of-Words (BoW) model with term frequency–inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighting, which captures shared vocabulary or identical text segments between proposal and the agreement. This method converts each document into a high-dimensional vector of word frequencies and compares them by calculating the cosine of the angle between these vectors. In my dataset, BoW similarity scores span from 0.02 to 0.716, with a mean of 0.306. Appendix Subection 2.1 details the implementation of both algorithms.

The key independent variable is the strength of rural mobilization, which is measured as a binary indicator—equal to 1 if at least one rural movement signed the proposal—and

the proportion of rural movements per proposal. I manually coded citizen organizations into rural movements or non-rural movements for each proposal submitted to the Havana peace table. Rural movements include grassroots organizations—such as community action boards (or village- and neighborhood-level organizations) or territorial organizations (or *movimientos de base*)—that represent the rural poor—including indigenous *resguardos* or Afro-descendant collective territories and peasant organizations. Non-rural movements encompass NGOs, think tanks, business firms, economic interest groups, and political parties. Coding procedures are detailed in Appendix Subection 2.2.

I estimate OLS regression models with year-fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The unit of analysis is the individual citizen proposal submitted by civilian organizations. To improve comparability across variables and enhance interpretability, I standardize continuous covariates. The general model is specified as follows:

$$Y_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{RuralMobilization}_{jt} + \beta' \text{Controls}_{jt} + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \tag{1}$$

Where Y_{jt} is the standardized similarity score for proposal j submitted in year t and $\text{RuralMobilization}_{jt}$ is either the binary indicator of rural signatories or the proportion of rural movement signatories. Controls_{jt} is a matrix of standardized proposal-level controls. The vector γ_t captures year fixed effects, which absorb time-specific shocks—such as changes in peace negotiation—that might otherwise confound the relationship between mobilization and agreement content. Since the dataset is aggregated at the proposal level and does not retain grouping identifiers such as organization or municipality codes, clustering standard errors at those levels is not feasible. Therefore, I employ HC3 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, which provide finite-sample corrections for high-leverage observations and are asymptotically equivalent to clustered standard errors when within-group correlation is absent.

I include proposal-level covariates that may influence proposal-agreement similarity scores. Proposal length (logged word count) controls for the possibility that longer petitions might be more likely to show high similarity with the agreement as they elaborate more detailed arguments. Thematic coverage is a binary variable that takes 1 when a

proposal addresses more than one peace agenda item. Proposals connected to multiple agenda items might be more likely to resonate with warring factions. Endowed organizations is a variable measuring the number of civilian organizations reliant upon prestige or institutional access—such as political parties, non-grassroots NGOs, and think tanks—that submitted petitions independently. These actors may shape dispositions through credibility or institutional access rather than grassroots organizing. As per hypothesis 1, I expect that proposals endorsed by at least one rural movement will show higher similarity to land commitments in the peace agreement.

Finally, I evaluate this evidence based on my main hypothesis against the alternative hypotheses of elite concession and rebel extraction (Liu, 2024; Zaks, 2017). Holding constant government and rebel preferences and elite resistance, I examine whether rural mobilization strength explains divergent outcomes in two negotiation deadlocks over illicit crop substitution and communal property rights.

5 Tracing Deadlock and Commitment in Land Redistribution Bargaining

In the Colombian peace process, land redistribution emerged as a central bargaining issue at the table yet it rapidly became subject to negotiation impasses due to the warring sides' divergent redistributive preferences. Figure 3 maps the critical events along the causal chain connecting initial deadlock over land reform to the signing of the peace agreement that incorporated land redistribution commitments. The signatories addressed land claims in the first agenda item on rural development between December 2012 and May 2013, and the fourth item on illicit crop substitution from January to May 2014. In both instances, rural movements deployed their organizational and moral assets to shape the terms of compromise, performing as informational conduits, agenda setters, and drivers of preferences. In the following sections, I trace the emergence and resolution of the bargaining problem, focusing on how rural movements employed the crisis credibility and moral credibility mechanisms to allow the warring sides to commit to redistributing

land.

5.1 The Bargaining Problem of Land Redistribution

At the exploratory, secret talks, between December 2012 and August 2012, both the Santos' administration and FARC-EP held fixed, competing preferences toward redistribution, which locked them in negotiation impasses (CPO 1 in Table 1). Land inequality surfaced as a central issue early in the talks when FARC-EP conditioned the formal launch of negotiation on including land reform in the agenda (interviews 17, 22, 23, 26, and 46) (Acosta, 2010). Initially, insurgents insisted on expropriation as the chief mechanism for land reform, reflecting both this guerrilla group's ideological commitments and recruitment base (interviews 22, 26, and 46). Expropriatory land reform had long represented "FARC-EP's DNA," as former high commanders described it (interviews 23 and 26).[4] The group's composition reinforced this stance: Of the 10,015 combatants who demobilized in 2017, 7,012 (70%) were peasants (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2017).

In contrast, the Santos government held minimalist preferences, viewing peace negotiation as a vehicle for global market integration rather than redistribution (interviews 5 and 20). As a high-ranked official noted, "diminishing land concentration was not necessarily incompatible with foreign investment in the countryside (...) where there was enough farmland to address rural unrest and boost food production for international supply chains" (interview 5). Such position aligned closely with the administration's development strategy, which prioritized mining and agribusiness over redistributive policies (Jaskoski, 2022; Shenk, 2022).

Against this backdrop of competing preferences, the August 2012 framework agreement included land issues on the negotiating agenda (Gobierno de Colombia, nd). Offi-

[4]At the seventh conference held in 1982, the group issued a "revolutionary agrarian reform bill" mandating *de facto* redistribution from large landowners to landless peasants. Land reform had previously been a key theme in peace talks, including the 1984 La Uribe accord and the 1999 FARC-EP Shared Agenda for Change discussed during the El Caguán peace talks. At these talks, the guerrilla group also proposed an illicit crop substitution plan—which was crafted by its high commander Manuel Marulanda Vélez—extending land reform to war economies.

Figure 3: Peace Bargaining of Land Redistribution



cials described this concession as "the 'golden bridge' for FARC-EP" (interviews 5, 20, 29, and 30) (Gobierno de Colombia, 2012b). Declassified drafts from February and April 2012 included an agenda covering land titling, restitution for victims of civil war dispossession, and state support for illicit crop substitution under the rubric of 'agrarian development and rural poverty' (Gobierno de Colombia, 2012a). Following this framework agreement, peace talks moved toward agrarian development and rural poverty.

However, the warring factions remained deadlocked over redistribution. FARC-EP agreed to forgo blanket expropriation, acknowledging that radical land reform is rarely achieved through negotiated settlement and instead often follows revolutionary victories—as seen in China, Russia, and Cuba (interviews 22, 26, and 46). Still, rebels insisted on land reform mechanisms aimed at reclaiming large, unproductive estates and the reallocation of land property to peasants who gradually moved away from coca-leaf cultivation (interviews 23 and 26) (FARC-EP, 2012). By contrast, the government narrowed land inequality issues down to violent dispossession, insecure property rights, and agricultural services for peasants who were no longer involved in the coca-leaf economy (interview 5). For Santos' team, farmers could legitimately hold vast tracts of land—regardless of use—insofar as ownership was not tied to drug trafficking or wartime seizure (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018, p. 84).

5.2 Rural Movements as Enablers of Commitment: Crisis and Moral Credibility

> *We demanded land reform as communities whose rights cannot be overridden by warring sides, not even in the context of peace negotiations.*
>
> (interview 25)

Rural movements emerged as autonomous, unarmed civilians, who helped the factions overcome such deadlocks by playing three main roles in peace negotiation (CPO 2 in Table

1). First, these movements transmitted local grievances to both sides to the negotiating table. Government and insurgent representatives alike drew upon movement demands to refine their proposals, viewing rural organizations as "ears on the ground" after a long war that had left both sides disconnected from land grievances (interview 29). Government negotiators used movement demands to gauge whether proposed policies "would resonate with affected communities" (interview 20). Similarly, insurgent negotiators grounded their demands on rural populations' grievances, systematically aligning their negotiation documents with the language of rural grievances (interviews 16 and 23).

Second, rural movements introduced substantive policy inputs that expanded the scope of warring side's preferences. Advisors emphasized that movements directed attention beyond land titling to issues such as agricultural subsidies (interviews 29 and 47) and land reform tailored to coca-growing regions (interview 30). Rebels also used rural movement demands to update their stance on economic redistribution at the bargaining table, aligning it more closely with contemporary rural conflicts (interviews 4, 16, 17, 23, and 46). A former high-ranking commander acknowledged that movement claims updated his understanding of rural grievances: "I had never encountered demands like food sovereignty until I read proposals from the first nationwide proposal-making forum in December 2012" (interview 17). Echoing this point, peasant leaders noted that while FARC-EP "had historically framed peasants as agrarian wage-laborers within a class-based paradigm" (interview 1), the guerrilla group "adapted its approach to incorporate claims linking land access to political incorporation, which had been largely overlooked in rebel agendas" (interview 3).

Third, rural movements shaped the fixed and competing preferences of warring factions through two mechanisms: crisis credibility and moral credibility. Through crisis credibility, rural mobilization increased the government's capacity to make costly concessions despite business resistance (CPO 3 in Table 1). Although expropriation was swiftly ruled out, alternative land reform measures encountered strong opposition from economic elites, who only pursued property rights security (interviews 5 and 29). Business groups closely monitored peace talks, holding regular checkup meetings with officials and

appointing key representatives to the government's negotiating team (Portafolio, 2015; RCN, 2015). Figures such as Sergio Jaramillo (High Commissioner for Peace, formerly head of the business-led think tank *Fundación Ideas para la Paz*), Frank Pearl (former CEO in major private firms), Alejandro Éder (a prominent figure in the Valle del Cauca sugar industry), and Luis Carlos Villegas (president of the National Business Association, ANDI) worked to align peace commitments with private sector interests (interviews 5, 20, and 29).

Rural movements drew on their organizational capacity to stage widespread protest across Colombian municipalities, raising the costs of resisting reform. Rural-poor protest took center stage in national politics during the Havana peace talks, echoing waves of mobilization not seen since the 1970s. Figure 4 shows that national- and regional-level rural protest increased significantly between 2012 and 2016, compared to the more localized protest of the 2000s.[5] Key events included the 2013 nationwide agrarian strike and the 2013 and 2014 coca-growing strikes. Rural movements from 641 municipalities submitted 98,550 protest demands, including 14,312 claims on land access for the rural poor, the recognition of landholdings as communal property, state protection for national agriculture, and a halt to extractive projects (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2014; Roa-Clavijo, 2023). Between 2013 and 2014, coca-growing peasants also launched regional strikes across the country, demanding state-sponsored crop substitution programs, land ownership, and reparations for forced eradication (Ramírez, 2017).

[5]Due to data access limitations, I cannot compare temporal trends in protest activity between rural and urban movements.



Figure 4: Rural Protest Before and After Peace Negotiation
Source: Social Struggles Dataset, CINEP (2024).

Government negotiators recalled that rural-poor protest compelled them to broaden the range of acceptable concessions. One official emphasized that "the negotiation team actively coordinated with local government branches tasked with managing protests, both to contain rural contention and to ensure that local negotiations with protesters aligned with peace dispositions under discussion in Havana" (interview 30). Another official reported that just minutes before the warring sides signed the final agreement in August 2016, the government conceded to ethnic land demands after Indigenous movements threatened to blockade major highways: "ethnic communities insisted that if the peace accord did not include their land claims, they would oppose the peace process—a price we [the government] could not afford" (interview 20). Rebel negotiators also perceived rural protest as a key source of political cover for redistributive demands at the table. One former commander recalled that the "2013 agrarian strike helped us show that land demands were endorsed by peasant movements, who quickly gained support from citizens beyond urban centers as well" (interview 23).

Through moral credibility, unarmed movements increased legitimacy for land reform by positioning it as a civilian demand rather than a rebel reward (CPO 4 in Table 1). Initially, FARC-EP claimed a spokesperson role for rural grievances, borrowing movement

petitions to bolster its stance (interview 23). Yet this strategy risked backfiring because elites could brand costly concessions as rebel victories. Government negotiators warned against meeting maximalist guerrilla demands, which would erode public support for the peace process by raising the question of why the government"should address policies with those who bore weapons?" (Gobierno de Colombia, 2012b, p. 5).

Rural movements cultivated distancing capacity to detach land reform from insurgent ownership and recast it as a broad civic mandate. Interviewees consistently highlighted how rural organizations leveraged their moral authority as *unarmed* civilians who did not participate in the war. As one activist put it, "peasant organizations conveyed a clear message to the government: we raise land demands on our own terms, seeking to influence land reform in the agreement" (interview 15). An indigenous leader echoed this point, noting that "ethnic movements articulated their claims as civilians who were not represented by any side to the table—particularly FARC, which sought to claim the role of spokesperson for rural communities" (interview 9).

The unarmed nature of rural mobilization provided a credible counterweight to elite resistance. An official underscored this point: "If the government was negotiating peace with a guerrilla group, how could it ignore unarmed civilians raising parallel rural claims?" (interview 5). Another government negotiator articulated how the moral authority of unarmed rural communities allowed both sides to overcome deadlock over land reform in coca-growing areas: "The legitimacy of Indigenous or peasant communities' voices, who cultivated coca leaf themselves, was indisputable for both the Santos government and FARC." (interview 30).

This influence was largely unanticipated. At the onset of peace negotiation, the Santos' administration had regarded "citizen engagement as a small concession" because "citizens cannot act as referees or mediators" (interview 5). Yet officials eventually acknowledged that peasant and Indigenous organizations performed "informal mediators between the government and FARC-EP" (interview 30). Taken together, this evidence suggests that rural movements positioned land reform as an urgent and legitimate commitment in the final peace agreement, consistent with the main hypothesis.

6 Assessing the Inclusion of Rural Demands into Peace Agreement Content

To assess whether rural movement demands were more systematically incorporated into the peace agreement, I estimate whether type of civilian organizations that submitted petitions to the Havana peace table is associated with increases in textual alignment between citizen proposals and the agreement's land provisions. Table 2 reports estimates from OLS models, using alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable (CPO 5 in Table 1). Models 1—4 employ cosine similarity measured through the SBERT algorithm that accounts for semantic alignment, while Models 5—8 rely on bag-of-word similarity that captures lexical overlap. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 present baseline specifications, whereas models 3, 4, 7, and 8 include year fixed effects. All models employ HC3 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Before reporting estimates, it is worth noting that SBERT similarity scores in the sample span a relatively narrow range from 0.302 at the 5th percentile to 0.615 at the 95th percentile. This distributional range is essential for interpreting coefficient magnitudes.

OLS regression estimates indicate that rural mobilization is associated with greater semantic alignment between citizen proposals and the peace agreement's land commitments at a statistically significant level. In Model 1—the baseline specification—proposals endorsed by at least one rural movement score 0.186 standard deviations higher on semantic similarity compared to those without rural movements' endorsement ($p < 0.001$), holding other variables constant. In the full specification with year fixed effects (Model 3), this estimate is 0.193 standard deviations ($p < 0.001$). Converting to the raw similarity scale, these coefficients correspond to increases of approximately 0.017—0.018 similarity points relative to a sample mean of 0.454, which is equivalent to roughly 5 percent of the observed distributional range and a shift of approximately 7 percentile ranks up the similarity distribution. Using the continuous measure of mobilization strength, Models 2 and 4 show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of rural movement petitioners is associated with increases of 0.092 and 0.086 standard deviations respectively

($p < 0.001$), corresponding to raw increases of approximately 0.008 similarity points or roughly 3 percent of the observed spread.

Table 2: Main OLS Results

	SBERT Similarity				**BoW Similarity**			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.186***		0.193***		0.103**		0.126***	
	(0.031)		(0.030)		(0.038)		(0.032)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.092***		0.086***		0.057***		0.058***
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.014)
Number of Signatures (std)	−0.025**	−0.011	−0.036***	−0.020*	−0.003	0.005	−0.017	−0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Proposal Length (log, std)	0.463***	0.464***	0.443***	0.444***	0.384***	0.385***	0.341***	0.342***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Thematic Coverage	0.088***	0.090***	0.146***	0.147***	0.123***	0.124***	0.144***	0.144***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Endowed Organizations (std)	0.032*	0.031*	0.042**	0.034*	−0.009	−0.006	0.002	−0.002
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Observations	8238	8238	8238	8238	8237	8237	8237	8237
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.306	0.306	0.306	0.306

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

Models 5—8 show that these results hold across specifications employing the bag-of-word algorithm. Yet the effect sizes are relatively smaller in magnitude. Proposals endorsed by at least one rural movement score 0.103 standard deviations higher on lexical similarity in the baseline specification (Model 5, $p < 0.01$) and 0.126 standard deviations higher in the full specification (Model 7, $p < 0.001$). These coefficients correspond to raw increases of 0.010—0.013 similarity points relative to a BoW sample mean of 0.306. In Models 6 and 8, the proportion estimates are 0.057—0.058 standard deviations ($p < 0.001$), equivalent to approximately 0.006 similarity points.

These findings may still raise concerns based on two main threats to inference. First, these correlations might be spurious if both citizen proposals and the peace agreement drew on a shared, previous agrarian discourse that circulated long before peace negotiation. If that were the case, movement-endorsed proposals would exhibit systematically higher similarity across land-related sections of the peace agreement because they only share surface-level jargon with the agreement. To address this possibility, I operationalize the dependent variable through SBERT similarity measuring whether citizen proposals and the peace agreement align in policy content. Consistent with expectation, the estimates are positive and significant across SBERT and BoW models, strengthening the inference that rural movements shaped the agreement's content rather than merely its vocabulary (See Table 2).

As a robustness check, I recompute semantic, SBERT similarity by restricting comparisons to specific thematic sections. Table 3 reports estimates along the themes of land reform, ex-combatant economic reintegration, land reform in coca-growing areas, and victims' land restitution. Contrary to the common-cause expectation, the results show that rural mobilization is not associated with higher similarity across all topics. Models 1-4 and 9-12 show that rural mobilization is positively associated with semantic similarity in provisions related to broad land reform (first chapter) and land reform in coca-growing areas (fourth chapter). By contrast, Models 13-16 show no statistically significant relationship between rural mobilization and similarity in provisions on victims' land restitution. As shown in Models 5-8, neither measure of rural mobilization is sta-

tistically associated with similarity on ex-combatant economic reintegration, which runs against the alternative rebel-extraction hypothesis that I examine below.

Second, these estimates might only reflect self-selection into proposal-making forums. Organizations engaged with these participatory forums may differ from those that did not in mobilization resources or linkages with either the government or guerrilla group. If this selection is correlated with proposal-agreement similarity—because, for instance, better-equipped, well-connected organizations may anticipate negotiator preferences—it biases these estimates against finding a positive rural movement effect, as endowed organizations such as NGOs or political parties would instead produce higher-similarity proposals. Moreover, the main results remain robust after accounting for potential confounders, such as proposal length and endowed organizations. The positive and significant coefficients on endowed organization in the SBERT models indicate that resource-rich organizations such as business associations or political parties exert some influence on policy alignment, yet it does not attenuate the rural movement estimates (See Table 2).

I conduct two robustness checks. First, I re-estimate the models on a restricted sample of proposals submitted before the parties announced partial agreements on each negotiation item, yielding a lower-bound estimate of the relationship. As shown in Table 5 in Online Appendix Subsection 3.1, the main results remain robust. Second, I replicate the analysis using cosine similarity scores between proposals and the revised peace agreement signed on November 24, 2016, following the October 2 plebiscite in which citizens rejected the peace accord by a narrow margin of 0.4% (See Online Appendix Subsection 3.2). In addition, I implement a placebo test using security-sector reform proposals matched to agreement sections that addressed security issues. Since the final agreement did not provide for security sector reform, this test allows me to assess whether the observed associations are artifacts of the similarity metric or text length. As shown in Online Appendix Section 4, no statistically significant correlations are found in this placebo sample, lending support to the measurement validity of the main results.

Table 3: OLS Analysis of Proposals and Agreement Similarity Per Thematic Section (SBERT, standardized)

	Land Reform				Ex-combatant Economic Reintegration				Land Reform in Coca-Growing Areas				Victims' Land Restitution			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12	M13	M14	M15	M16
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.166***		0.175***		0.225		0.219		0.292		0.243		0.124*		0.086	
	(0.043)		(0.044)		(0.199)		(0.192)		(0.154)		(0.143)		(0.050)		(0.048)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.073***		0.071***		0.007		0.007		0.128*		0.100*		0.042		0.036
		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.089)		(0.085)		(0.052)		(0.047)		(0.022)		(0.021)
Number of Signatures	−0.007	0.004	−0.014	−0.002	0.025	0.040	0.082	0.097	0.083**	0.105***	0.093**	0.111***	0.046**	0.057***	0.071**	0.080***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Proposal Length (log)	0.438***	0.438***	0.423***	0.424***	0.429***	0.426***	0.363***	0.361***	0.404***	0.404***	0.372***	0.371***	0.485***	0.486***	0.523***	0.524***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Thematic Coverage	−0.299***	−0.297***	−0.183***	−0.183***	0.026	0.012	0.234	0.224	0.207**	0.211**	0.282***	0.285***	−0.136***	−0.136***	−0.105**	−0.105**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Endowed Organizations	0.012	0.005	0.023	0.011	0.194*	0.120	0.201*	0.127	0.035	0.021	0.030	0.014	0.047*	0.033	0.033	0.028
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Num.Obs.	4713	4713	4713	4713	251	251	251	251	539	539	539	539	2735	2735	2735	2735
R2	0.199	0.199	0.217	0.216	0.196	0.190	0.251	0.246	0.214	0.213	0.242	0.241	0.231	0.230	0.258	0.258
R2 Adj.	0.198	0.198	0.215	0.214	0.179	0.174	0.223	0.218	0.207	0.206	0.230	0.228	0.230	0.229	0.255	0.255
Std.Errors	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3
FE: Year			YES	YES			YES	YES			YES	YES			YES	YES

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

7 Alternative Explanations: Elite Concession and Rebel Extraction

I now turn to assess two main alternative explanations for redistributive commitments in the 2016 peace agreement (CPO 5 in Table 1). The elite concession hypothesis holds that negotiated settlements include redistributive provisions when moderate governments gain autonomy from recalcitrant factions and adopt pro-poor preferences (García Trujillo, 2020). Applied to Colombia, this account expects that President Santos would pursue redistributive reform in the peace agreement because his administration had gained autonomy from Alvaro Uribe's faction—which represented rentier capital opposed to peace negotiation and redistribution—and the government had shown preferences for pro-poor policies through the enactment of the 2011 land restitution program for war victims—a year before the Havana talks began. In contrast, the rebel extraction hypothesis posits that redistribution is forged in negotiations when rebels exploit civilian mobilization to strengthen their bargaining leverage at the table (Leventoğlu and Metternich, 2018). In the Colombian case, this alternative account expects FARC-EP would extract redistribution from the government by channeling peasant protest into bargaining power at the table.

To test these explanations, I compare two negotiation deadlocks: illicit crop substitution and communal property rights for peasant communities. Both cases involved costly concessions, elite resistance, government minimalist preferences, and rebels' hard stance. Yet the peace agreement ultimately enshrined commitments on crop substitution yet excluded provisions on communal land ownership. This most-similar comparison probes whether variation in mobilization strength—rather than elite concessions or rebel extraction—better accounts for why some redistributive demands enter peace settlements while others do not.

In the first case, illicit crop substitution remained a contentious issue at the table between January 2013 and May 2014. Nearly a year before the topic was formally addressed, FARC-EP proposed the transfer of land rights and agricultural support for coca

growers, along with the legalization of drug cultivation for cultural and therapeutic purposes (Bermúdez Liévano, 2013c). This proposal stood in sharp contrast to the government's militarized "war on drugs" strategy, which had relied on forced eradication and criminal prosecution. Between 1994 and 2015, 1.8 million hectares of coca leaf were fumigated, causing environmental and health crises (Rodriguez, 2020). From 2005 to 2013, approximately 1,500 peasants were imprisoned on drug-trafficking charges (Gobierno de Colombia, 2014a). Such militarized approach excluded coca growers from land reform, offering only conditional cash transfers once crops were forcibly eradicated and promoting agribusiness projects on cleared land (Presidencia de la República, 2008; Gutiérrez Montenegro, 2016). Against the elite concession hypothesis, Santos' administration did not hold maximalist preferences for redistribution.

This issue reached deadlock at the bargaining table. On June 11, 2013, peasant movements launched a 53-day strike in Catatumbo——a coca-growing region bordering Venezuela that ranked third in coca cultivation in 2012 (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y El Delito, 2013). Approximately 7,000 participants demanded the reallocation of property rights to the poor, communal-use programs, and a halt on forced eradication and criminal prosecution (Tiempo, 2013b). These demands nonetheless encountered resistance from oil palm firms, refinery companies, and drug-trafficking networks, which each sought to preserve control over land for extraction (interviews 19 and 24) (Espinosa Rincón, 2018). Movements blocked major transportation routes for oil palm and refinery companies while cutting off commerce with Venezuela (Tiempo, 2013a). Oil palm firms reported losses of over 1.2 million hectares of produce, amounting to roughly $5 million USD during the protests (Fedepalma, 2013).

Nonetheless, state officials initially rejected engagement with movements. President Santos and the Minister of Defense alleged that guerrilla fighters, disguised as civilians, were orchestrating the protests to establish an autonomous zone for coca cultivation and arms trafficking (Tiempo, 2013d). The police and military cracked down unarmed civilians, leaving 4 dead and over 200 injured (interviews 18, 19, 24, and 41).

Civilian casualties, however, sparked condemnation of state repression among local

authorities, members of Congress, and the UN Office for Human Rights in Colombia (The Governor of Norte de Santander et al., 2013; Semana, 2013b; Marcha Patriótica, 2013). The Vice-President publicly sided with coca growers, remarking that the government "should not pose heavier hand on those who comply with the law than those who act outside it." As such, this statement questioned the government's dual approach to rural grievances wherein Santos' administration advanced peace negotiation over agrarian issues with FARC-EP in Havana yet refused to engage with unarmed civilians protesting in Colombia's countryside (Tiempo, 2013c).

Between August and December 2013, sustained mobilization forced the government to seal agreements with peasant organizations, allocating cash transfers and agricultural assistance for agricultural transition. These agreements also halted forced eradication and provided reparations for fumigation victims. Importantly, they mandated administrative agencies to prioritize property rights allocation in coca-growing areas (Mac Master and Quintero, 2013; Escobar Arango and Abril Abril, 2013; Escobar Arango et al., 2013). The Catatumbo protest negotiations set a precedent for similar strikes in other coca-growing regions, such as Cauca, Arauca, and Putumayo (interviews 28, 37, and 39).

Through the crisis credibility mechanism, protest agreements drew boundaries for acceptable concessions on this issue at the peace table. As a peasant leader noted, "The strikes forced the national government to recognize us as legitimate interlocutors and to accept that our negotiations needed to be linked to the peace talks in Havana" (interview 37). A government advisor further confirmed this influence: "In Havana, we [the government] monitored protest agreements from Catatumbo, Putumayo, Cauca, and Caquetá to draw the boundaries of concessions in the peace agreement. We could not commit to anything that conflicted with what other branches had already agreed with rural communities back in Colombia" (interview 30). Movements also engaged in parallel talks with insurgent negotiators, tempering their hard stance. Coca-growing activists met with insurgent representatives to co-draft proposals on a gradual, voluntary, and participatory substitution program (interviews 22, 23, 26, 28, 37, 44) (FARC-EP, 2014a).

Simultaneously, peasant organizations influenced negotiation outcomes by increasing

legitimacy for their claims through the mechanism of moral credibility. As one official recalled, "unarmed peasant organizations set the terms of negotiation because they directly suffered criminalization and violence" (interview 30). This evidence indicates that peasant organizations acted as autonomous actors in peace negotiations, challenging a key assumption under the rebel extraction hypothesis.

By combining crisis credibility and moral credibility, coca-growing movements reshaped the fixed and competing preferences of Santos' administration and FARC-EP, when the issue formally entered the table between December 2013 and January 2014. On May 16, 2014, the warring sides reached a partial agreement that allowed coca growers to gain land rights and state support as they transitioned to licit production. The program also established participatory institutions for local communities to shape development projects in former war-economy enclaves. While the government rejected a fully gradual rollout, it conceded to start support before forced eradication, reserving it as a last resort (Gobierno de Colombia, 2014b; Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2014a; Gobierno de Colombia, 2014d,c; Gobierno de Colombia and FARC-EP, 2014b; FARC-EP, 2014b) (interviews 20, 22, 23, 26, 29, and 30).[6] The 2016 final agreement closely mirrored peasant demands. A Catatumbo peasant put it, "When compared to the 2013 protest agreement, the 2016 peace accord enshrined core principles we proposed." (interview 19).

In the second case, collective land ownership for peasant communities remained as a contentious issue at the table between October 2012 and May 2013. Until late 2012, land negotiations significantly stalled over the withdrawal of property rights on unproductive land (Bermúdez Liévano, 2018). In December 2012, peasant organizations demanded communal property rights (interviews 2, 19, 24, 27, 40, and 44). In January 2013, FARC-EP formally integrated these claims into its agenda (interviews 4, 16, 17) (FARC-EP, 2013a). Against the alternative explanations, this evidence suggests that movements brought a new outcome to the table that neither the government nor rebels had initially introduced.

By March 2013, however, the government firmly rejected peasants' proposal, argu-

[6]The agreement ambiguously referenced aerial fumigation, which was later banned in 2015 after the World Health Organization classified glyphosate as a carcinogen (BBC News Mundo, 2015).

ing that collective ownership should remain exclusive to Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities (Gobierno de Colombia, 2013c,a,b). As in the case of coca-growing peasants, the Ministries of Defense and Agriculture, along with military officials, alleged that peasant reserve zones served as guerrilla strongholds (Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas, 2013; Semana, 2013a). At the same time, the Ministry of Mines and Energy reassured extractive companies that peasant collective land rights would not interfere with mining and hydrocarbon projects (Bermúdez Liévano, 2013a). Elites also closed ranks against communal land ownership. The National Cattle Ranchers' Federation (FEDEGAN) dismissed peasant reserve zones as "guerrilla enclaves" (El Nuevo Siglo, 3 14), while agribusiness and mining firms feared that extending communal property rights to peasants would undermine their undergoing projects. Contrary to the elite concession hypothesis, this evidence suggests that Santos' administration prioritized elite economic interests and security concerns.

As negotiations reached deadlock, peasants convened a national summit where 3,000 rural leaders ratified the proposal for communal property in March 2013 (interviews 12 and 15) (Bermúdez Liévano, 2013b; García-Reyes, 2013). Movements also sought to take their demands directly to Havana, but unlike coca growers, they were denied formal participation in peace talks (FARC-EP, 2013b) (interviews 2, 19, 24, 27, 40, and 44). Excluded from official channels, peasants instead engaged in parallel talks with FARC-EP, co-drafting a communal land ownership proposal (interviews 26, 44, and 46).

Yet these parallel talks reinforced the government's view that this demand amounted to a capitulation to insurgent pressure. Unlike coca-growing organizations, officials recalled that demands for collective land ownership were associated with peasant organizations perceived as closely tied to insurgent infrastructures. Nor did these demands gain traction as a civilian mandate within Santos' negotiating team. One official underscored that the government "agreed to address contentious issues in the peace agreement in response to social mobilization by peasant organizations independent from the guerrilla group; that was not clearly the case for radical organizations that, for example, sought to extend communal property to peasants" (interview 5). A foreign envoy further reinforced

this assessment, noting that "peasant movements advancing radical demands—such as communal property—were seen as aligned with FARC" (interview 48).

Therefore, these movements failed to drive the inclusion of peace commitments on collective land property for peasant communities. On May 26, 2013, negotiators reached an agreement on rural development, which pledged to boost the implementation of peasant reserve zones yet did not upgrade them to communal property. Three months later, movements joined the 2013 agrarian strike in which communal property for peasants emerged as a key demand (Ardila Arrieta and Nicolás Guillot, 2013) (interviews 12, 15, 21). Nonetheless, the government effectively insulated peace talks from peasant protest, thus keeping this claim off the peace agenda (Bermúdez Liévano, 2014). Because movements did not develop both organizational capacity and distancing capacity, they lacked the ability to alter elite resistance or provide legitimacy for their demands before the signatories.

The divergent outcomes of illicit crop substitution and peasant communal property suggest that variation in mobilization strength better explains why rural movements shape redistributive commitments in peace settlements. In both cases, Santos' administration held to a minimalist approach, which contradicts the expectation that moderate governments would concede redistribution. The rebel extraction hypothesis does not explain these outcomes either. FARC-EP maintained maximalist preferences for redistribution across both issues, but their demands alone did not move negotiations forward. This evidence demonstrates that variation in mobilization strength better explain such divergent outcome.

8 Conclusion

In civil wars, land reform lies at the core of war termination, as land inequality often underpins armed rebellions. I developed and tested a bargaining theory of land redistribution in civil war peace settlements. I argued that peace negotiations trigger political openings for non-armed civilians to delineate the range of acceptable concessions at bar-

gaining tables. Yet whether redistributive reform is enshrined in peace settlements depends on the mobilization strength of unarmed, rural movements who shape the warring sides' fixed and competing preferences toward redistribution. I then showed that rural movements largely shaped land commitments outlined in the 2016 Colombian peace agreement by increasing the costs of resistance—or the mechanism of crisis credibility—and folding reform as a civilian mandate—or the mechanism of moral credibility.

The influence of rural mobilization on land reform in peace settlements is not unique to Colombia. In El Salvador, for instance, the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords established a land transfer program that combined market-based and state-led mechanisms to reallocate 11% of farmland ownership to landless peasants and former combatants (De Bremond, 2007; McReynolds, 2002). While the guerrilla group FMLN initially placed land inequality at the center of its bargaining agenda, the Cristiani administration opposed any redistributive reform, thus giving rise to negotiation impasses. Similar to the Colombian case, unarmed peasant movements rendered reform as an unavoidable commitment at the bargaining table, posing costs on political and economic stability, including in the capital (Wood, 2000).

Future research may further investigate the conditions under which unarmed civilians grow in mobilization strength as armed conflicts draw to an end. In settings marked by genocidal violence or extreme repression, social movements may encounter severe barriers to articulating grievances and influencing warring factions at the table. Commitments to redress dispossession in peace settlements are a crucial breakthrough, but they mark only an initial step in preventing relapse into violence. More research is needed to examine when and these commitments translate into transfers of land to the rural poor, thereby addressing entrenched inequalities and consolidating peace.

These findings carry implications for other instances where organized civilians pursue costly concessions at bargaining. Distributive disputes—such as welfare expansion or labor rights—and accountability demands—like human rights trials and reparations—encounter similar barriers to land redistribution at bargaining tables, as competing preferences among negotiating actors and elite resistance generate impasse. Post-authoritarian

settlement and constitutional conventions entail comparable uncertainty with civil wars, wherein political and economic arrangements are open to reconfiguration. Across these issues and settings, organized civilians can expand the range of concessions when they sustain contention and credibly distance themselves from discredited political actors.

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