

Online Appendix

April 10, 2026

1 Quantitative Analysis: Variables and Operationalization

1.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources

Figure 1 shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for dependent, independent, and control variables, indicating data sources.

Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Source
DV	SBERT cosine similarity scores	8239	0.453	0.093	0.137	0.769	Own elaboration (semantic & lexical similarity between citizen proposals and the 2016 peace accord's rural sections)
	BoW tf-idf cosine similarity scores	8239	0.306	0.101	0.028	0.716	
IV	Rural mobilization (dummy)	8239	0.61	0.487	0	1	FIP (Citizen proposals)
Control variables	Proposal Length	8239	99.72	88.89	34	2694	
	Signatures	8239	2.32	4.17	1	32	
	Topic Coverage	8239	0.538	0.498	0	1	
	Endowed Organizations	8239	0.357	0.622	0	14	

1.2 Dependent Variable: Text Reuse in the 2016 Peace Agreement

While the dataset includes a large number of collective petitioners' proposals, the documents are relatively short. They range from 2,694 to 34 words, showing a mean of 99 words. These petitions address multiple topics and are signed by several petitioners. Documents cover diverse land claims, such as land redistribution, land restitution for civil war victims, and extractive industries cessation.

Before calculating cosine similarity scores, I pre-processed the rural development sections of the peace agreement using conventional techniques (Grimmer et al., 2022). First, I performed lemmatization through Stanza, a Python library designed by the Stanford NLP Group, which reduces words to their base forms (e.g., “hará,” “haciendo,” and “hizo” become “hacer”). Second, I standardized frequent terms employing spaCy’s rule-based matcher engine to merge entities written in various forms into custom labels. This tool proved useful in standardizing divergent labels referring to same entities, such as “asamblea nacional constituyente,” “asamblea constituyente,” “asamblea nacional,” “constituyente,” and “ANC,” which were merged into “asamblea constituyente.” Third, I further processed the text corpora by lowercasing and removing punctuation marks and stop words (e.g., pronouns, articles, and auxiliary verbs). After this preprocessing procedure, I retained only those proposals containing at least 26 words, ensuring sufficient textual content for meaningful comparison.


To capture text alignment, I computed cosine similarity between citizen proposals focused on rural issues and the rural sections of the peace agreement. Cosine similarity measures how similar two texts are by comparing the angle between their vector representations in a high-dimensional spaces, in which texts with more similar content have vectors that point in similar directions. Cosine similarity ranges from 0 (no alignment) to 1 (identical content), and allows high-dimensional text data to be summarized as a single, comparable similarity score. Formally, it compares a vector of word or feature values (**A**) from one text with a vector (**B**) from another text, as specified in Equation

(1):

$$\cos(\theta) = \frac{\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{B}}{\|\mathbf{A}\| \|\mathbf{B}\|} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i B_i}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n A_i^2} \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n B_i^2}} \quad (1)$$

I employ two complementary approaches to represent texts as vectors and capture both semantic and lexical similarity between proposals and the agreement. First, I use a Sentence-BERT (SBERT) model to encode dense vector representations that capture contextual meaning instead of only word overlap (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019). Since the agreement text exceeds the model’s input limit, I split it into 27 contiguous chunks of up to 512 tokens each. I represent every chunk as a numerical vector that summarizes its semantic content, and then average these vectors to obtain a single representation of the full rural agreement. I apply the same procedure to citizen proposals, yielding one vector per proposal. Thus, similarity scores are computed between the averaged proposal and agreement vectors, producing one document-level measure per proposal. This aggregation strategy captures overall alignment between texts rather than rewarding isolated local overlaps. In my dataset, SBERT similarity scores range from 0.137 to 0.769, with a mean of 0.453. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of SBERT scores.


Figure 2: SBERT Similarity Distribution



As an alternative measure of the outcome, I implement a Bag-of-Words (BoW) model with term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) weighting to capture lexical overlap between proposals and the agreement. To minimize estimation bias, I down-weight common language found in the agreement and proposals by excluding frequent terms when constructing word vectors for cosine similarity computation. Following the principle that text informativeness is inversely proportional to frequency (Grimmer et al., 2022), I retain more informative—or less common—terms by introducing TF-IDF weighting as a parameter. TF-IDF produces a value that reflects both the importance of a term in a document (TF) and the uniqueness of that term across the corpus (IDF). Moreover, I exclude terms occurring in fewer than 5% of the documents to mitigate noise and reduce corpus dimensionality. Rare terms often lack sufficient informational value for effective comparison and may otherwise introduce skewness. Additionally, I normalize vector lengths during word vector distance calculations to minimize document length’s

effect on similarity scores. Finally, I apply Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) for dimensionality reduction, projecting high-dimensional term-document matrices into a compact semantic space. In this specification, similarity scores span from 0.028 to 0.716, with a mean of 0.453, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: BoW Similarity Distribution



Tables 1 and 2 list collective actors' proposal excerpts by the degree to which they record text reuse based on the bag-of-word and SBERT algorithms, respectively. Most highly-rated proposals refer to land reform in war zones through an illicit crop substitution program.

Table 1: Proposals Rated by Similarity to the Peace Agreement (Bag-of-word algorithm)

Proposal	Score
<p>“Guiding Principles for Voluntary Illicit Crop Substitution. Comprehensive Rural Development with Short, Medium, and Long-Term Support: In efforts to increase employment and income, a “full-package” approach is employed, which includes: Support for Productive Ventures: Regions have productive ventures aligned with the Regional Competitiveness Plan, the National Productive Ventures, and other promising initiatives that spark local market activity. The goal is to support collective territories and producer organizations with incentives for establishing or restoring lands previously abandoned due to illicit crops and illegal economies. Incentive values vary depending on the activity and are negotiated among participants. Technical assistance should include specialists in the crops chosen by each region. Fair Market Access: Perhaps the most crucial element, this principle recognizes that poor farmers in marginal areas struggle immensely to earn a fair price for their legal goods, while coca buyers offer direct, on-site purchasing. With coca, the market comes to the farmer; with legal production, market access is much harder. Market access includes continuous information about current demands, pre-purchase contracts, and ongoing technical advice on buyer requirements. Additionally, the solidarity and committed support of governments and the international community are vital, recognizing communities’ efforts through premium pricing for products from these regions. This compensates for their role in eradicating and preventing illicit crops, contributing to security, peace, and sustainable development for these communities. Value Addition and Market Access: Currently, local products and raw materials must travel long distances to reach processing and distribution centers, sometimes weakening competitiveness and reducing producers’ incomes. The program proposes setting up Product and Raw Material Processing Units within these regions. Achieving this requires policies to promote and incentivize public-private partnerships that address the economic factors needed for these processing units. It also calls for primary producers’ effective participation. Government support at municipal, departmental, and national levels, as well as from partners, should focus on ensuring these processing units are established locally, with local stakeholder involvement, and on placing these products in national and international markets under fair, sustainable conditions. Technology: Access to suitable technology is another major challenge for these families. Quality seeds, best agricultural and manufacturing practices, proper fertilization, certifications, and technical assistance are essential but not universally available. Technical assistance should comprehensively address these and other needs, aligning with program phases. Human Talent Development: In the Nariño Pacific Ethnodevelopment Plan, this component was known as “Educational Conversion” as it aims to lay the social foundations for sustainable development models and technology packages. A pilot plan for the voluntary substitution of illicit crops will be implemented with the following components: 1) Coordination by the Governor’s Office of Nariño; 2) The plan will operate without fumigation and will undergo evaluation every four months to determine its continuation; 3) The program will be structured at the municipal level, with the minimum implementation area being an entire municipality; 4) Active participation from the majority of the municipality’s inhabitants is required;</p>	0.702

Proposal	Score
<p>5) At least 70% of coca cultivators within the municipality must agree to either personally uproot their plants or commit to not replanting following manual or forced eradication; 6) The national government will contribute through agencies including the National Narcotics Office, DPS (Department for Social Prosperity), the National Police, and the Ministry of Agriculture; 7) Economic development will be promoted through collaboratively designed packages that include market access, technology, and financing for selected activities. Rather than relying on an assistance-based approach, financing will be provided to support the transition period until alternative activities generate income. 8) Priority will be given to social investment, implemented through a participatory process; 9) Both coca cultivators and non-cultivators will receive equal treatment to avoid creating incentives that inadvertently reward illicit cultivation; 10) The program will include sustained support for at least three years. 11) The work will be phased, starting with municipalities identified by police data as having the largest areas of coca cultivation. If the initial phase is successful, the program will be expanded to additional municipalities after six months.”¹</p>	0.702
<p>“Cumbre [Agraria Étnica, Popular y Campesina] Proposal: The Peasant Reserve Zones (ZRC) are agrarian initiatives that contribute to peacebuilding, to the guarantee of the political, economic, social, and cultural rights of peasant communities, to development grounded in socio-environmental and food sustainability, and to national reconciliation among Colombians. In the establishment of ZRCs, women’s participation shall be ensured regardless of their marital status or relationship situation. Women with spouses or partners shall receive individual recognition, and their involvement in rural development programs shall not render them invisible as part of a family unit. Consequently, the National Government, in coordination with the communities and in line with Principles 2 and 7 of this Agreement, shall promote access to land and land-use planning within the ZRCs. It shall provide concrete support to the development plans of both established and future ZRCs, in response to the initiatives of communities and agrarian organizations that those communities consider representative. This support shall aim to strengthen the peasant economy, contribute to closing the agricultural frontier, support food production, and protect areas designated as Forest Reserve Zones. Active participation by communities residing in the ZRCs in the implementation of their development plans shall be promoted. The representation of women and the inclusion of their proposals shall be guaranteed.”²</p>	0.700

Table 2: Proposals Rated by Similarity to the Peace Agreement (SBERT algorithm)

Proposal	Score
<p>“Victims: Land Restitution and Rural Development as Reparative and Transformative Measures for Victims of Land Dispossession and/or Forced Abandonment. In order to enable victims to fully enjoy their rights within a reparative framework, a series of actions are proposed to be carried out by territorial entities and national-level institutions. These actions should take the form of specifically designed programs and measures aimed at economic reestablishment, conceived within a rural development approach, for victims of land dispossession or forced abandonment, and linked to broader return strategies. a) A diagnostic assessment and action plan should be developed to identify the needs and expectations of the victims. This process must be participatory in nature, in order to define the activities to be undertaken based on the victims’ own knowledge and lived experiences. The ultimate goal is to design and implement, from the regional level, training and skills-development plans focused on productive activities, for both the victims and their families.”³</p>	0.769
<p>“What Is the Land Agreement and Comprehensive Rural Development? It refers to the development of all activities aimed at improving the quality of life of rural populations in their territories, based on the following components: building lasting peace, social justice, and collective well-being; carrying out a rural CONPES (National Council for Economic and Social Policy), which will guide the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of public policies in the rural sector. This body must ensure the participation of government ministers as well as representatives of Indigenous, Afro-descendant, peasant, and environmentalist communities; enacting rural development and agrarian reform committees, with active participation from civil society; a subsystem for land allocation, land improvement, and infrastructure for rural populations; a national subsystem for the generation and transfer of technology, as well as technical and business assistance; a subsystem for marketing and agro-industrial development to ensure national food production; a national subsystem of subsidized rural credit, aimed at small and medium-sized producers, within the framework of a solidarity-based economy; a subsystem of social assistance and security to provide rural communities with free access to services including healthcare, occupational risk protection, pensions, education, housing, employment, and recreation.”⁴</p>	0.759

Table 3 compares citizen proposals with high similarity scores and the peace agreement using the SBERT similarity algorithm (semantic similarity). Each row illustrates how grassroots proposals align—conceptually and linguistically—with corresponding commitments in the peace agreement, emphasizing shared priorities such as participatory planning, economic reestablishment, territorial inclusion, and the centrality of victims’ agency.

Table 3: Proposal-Agreement Comparison (using SBERT algorithm)


Proposal	Agreement
<p>“Victims: Land Restitution and Rural Development as Reparative and Transformative Measures for Victims of Land Dispossession and/or Forced Abandonment. In order to enable victims to fully enjoy their rights within a reparative framework, a series of actions are proposed to be carried out by territorial entities and national-level institutions. These actions should take the form of specifically designed programs and measures aimed at economic reestablishment, conceived within a rural development approach, for victims of land dispossession or forced abandonment, and linked to broader return strategies. a) A diagnostic assessment and action plan should be developed to identify the needs and expectations of the victims. This process must be participatory in nature, in order to define the activities to be undertaken based on the victims’ own knowledge and lived experiences. The ultimate goal is to design and implement, from the regional level, training and skills-development plans focused on productive activities, for both the victims and their families.”⁵</p>	<p>“Amid armed conflict cessation and with the aim of strengthening and accelerating land restitution processes, we have agreed that such processes will be integrated with collective reparation efforts, territorial development programs, and the plans and programs arising from the implementation of the Final Agreement. It is also agreed that: The implementation of land restitution policy shall be guided, among other factors, by technical criteria such as the historical density of dispossession and the conditions for return. It shall also take into account the recommendations—particularly those related to territorial targeting—offered by victims’ organizations and subject-matter experts. Territorial entities must actively participate in the implementation of the land restitution policy and contribute to the comprehensive attention to restitution beneficiaries through the formulation of their territorial development plans. This includes investments in infrastructure and public services. Beneficiaries of restitution processes shall receive both technical and financial support for the reconstruction of their life projects and income-generation strategies. They shall also receive support for the substitution of illicit crops, the recovery and rebuilding of the social fabric, the strengthening of community organizing processes, and the construction of historical memory aimed at reconciliation. Information resulting from entries in the Registry of Forcibly Dispossessed and Abandoned Lands, as well as from judicial rulings ordering land restitution, will be incorporated into the Unified Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas) in order to harmonize existing registries and ensure access to the full range of reparative measures.”⁶</p>

Proposal	Agreement
<p>“Guiding Principles for the Voluntary Substitution of Illicit Crops (...) 5. Inclusion of the Entire Rural Population of the Municipality or Community Council in the Economic-Productive Development Component. This is a fundamental element of the program, as it is essential to avoid sending the wrong message—that cultivating coca is a prerequisite for receiving state support and collaboration. Furthermore, one of the key design features is to leverage social pressure on those reluctant to participate; for this to be effective, it is crucial that the entire population benefits from the program. In other experiences, the selective inclusion of some beneficiaries while excluding others has led to social tensions that ultimately undermine positive outcomes. The intervention should focus on the components set forth in the Comprehensive Rural Development Plans of the Community Councils. These include: productive development, food security, comprehensive technical assistance, and the strengthening of territorial organizational capacities for socio-productive and entrepreneurial development.”⁷</p>	<p>“4.1.1. Principles. Given that the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) is part of the Comprehensive Rural Reform (RRI), it shall be governed not only by the principles established under that Reform, but also by the following additional principles: Joint, participatory, and consensual construction: The transformation of territories and the design of alternatives for communities affected by illicit crops shall be based on a process of joint and participatory construction between those communities and national, departmental, and municipal authorities. This process will aim to develop shared solutions to the problem of illicit crop cultivation and to overcome conditions of poverty. This joint construction is grounded in the autonomous decision of communities—both women and men—to abandon illicit crops and transition, through substitution, to other economic activities. Consensus-building with communities is a priority in the planning, implementation, and oversight of the Program within the territories.”⁸</p>

1.3 Independent Variable: Rural Mobilization

To operationalize my main independent variable, I used an original and so far unexplored dataset collected and assembled *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (FIP) under Santos’ administration commission. Thematically, this dataset classifies citizen proposals by peace agreement topics, including themes left unaddressed at the peace table, such as extractive industries and security sector reform. Figure 4 lists out agreement sub-themes recording the highest proportion of citizen proposals (more than 1% of the proposals).

Figure 4: Proportion of Citizen Proposals per Peace Agenda Topics



To identify rural movements from the universe of collective petitioners, I manually classified collective petitioners as rural movements if they were initially categorized as labor unions, indigenous *resguardos* (collective territories enjoying political autonomy), community action boards (or village- and neighborhood-level social organizations), and social organizations (or *movimientos de base*). I refined FIP’s petitioner classification by manually verifying the type of organization and the population represented by each petitioner using secondary sources. This procedure allowed me to distinguish between collective actors endowed with political and economic power—such as political parties, business firms, and economic interest groups—and rural movements.

Social movements actively engaged in participatory institutions during peace negotiation: on average, social movements submitted 5 proposals (standard deviation of ~ 12). At the subnational level, social movements from 299 municipalities participated in proposal-

making forums and approximately 4 rural movements sent proposals per municipality (standard deviation of ~15.1).

2 Main Results

2.1 OLS Analysis: Original Scale Variable

I conducted OLS regression models, retaining variables at their original scale. Table 4 displays estimates from OLS regression analysis with year fixed effects and robust standard errors. In Models 1-4, the outcome of interest is measured through the SBERT algorithm; while it is operationalized through the bag-of-word algorithm in Models 5-8. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 represent the baseline specification. Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 extend the baseline to include year fixed effects. All models employ HC3 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. These results suggest that rural mobilization strength—measured as either the presence of rural movements (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7) or increases in the proportion of rural movement signatories (Models 2, 4, 6, and 8)—is associated with increases in proposal-agreement similarity, providing further evidence for Hypothesis 1.

Table 4: Main OLS Results (DV in Original Scale)

	SBERT Similarity				BoW Similarity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.017*** (0.003)		0.018*** (0.003)		0.010** (0.004)		0.013*** (0.003)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.019*** (0.003)		0.017*** (0.003)		0.012*** (0.004)		0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Signatures	-0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Proposal Length	0.088*** (0.002)	0.088*** (0.002)	0.084*** (0.002)	0.084*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.002)	0.070*** (0.002)	0.070*** (0.002)
Thematic Coverage	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)
Endowed Organizations	0.005* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Observations	8238	8238	8238	8238	8237	8237	8237	8237
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.306	0.306	0.306	0.306

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

3 Robustness Checks

3.1 OLS Analysis of Restricted Sample

As a conservative robustness check, I re-estimate the regression models on a restricted sample of citizen proposals submitted before the parties announced partial agreements on each negotiation topic. Peace negotiations unfolded along a thematic timeline, wherein the warring factions reached partial agreements sequentially across issue areas. Although these interim agreements were not formally binding until the final accord in August 2016—and remained subject to revision throughout the process—they may nonetheless have influenced how citizens articulated their demands. To address this potential concern, I restrict the sample to proposals submitted prior to the public announcement of each thematic agreement. This restriction yields a lower-bound estimate of the relationship, as it excludes proposals that may already reflect emerging consensus or alignment with the negotiation agenda. As shown in Table 5, the results remain substantively unchanged, reinforcing the robustness of the main specification.

Table 5: OLS Results (Restricted Sample)

	SBERT Similarity				BoW Similarity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.164*** (0.034)		0.166*** (0.034)		0.060 (0.040)		0.067 (0.035)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.077*** (0.015)		0.071*** (0.015)		0.035* (0.017)		0.036* (0.016)
Number of Signatures (std)	0.000 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.010 (0.011)	0.029* (0.012)	0.034** (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)
Proposal Length (log, std)	0.490*** (0.014)	0.490*** (0.014)	0.477*** (0.014)	0.477*** (0.014)	0.415*** (0.012)	0.416*** (0.012)	0.383*** (0.012)	0.383*** (0.012)
Thematic Coverage	0.093*** (0.023)	0.095*** (0.023)	0.185*** (0.024)	0.186*** (0.024)	0.146*** (0.024)	0.147*** (0.024)	0.149*** (0.025)	0.149*** (0.025)
Endowed Organizations (std)	0.023 (0.015)	0.019 (0.014)	0.026 (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.029 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.015)
Observations	6220	6220	6220	6220	6219	6219	6219	6219
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.458	0.458	0.458	0.458	0.312	0.312	0.312	0.312

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

3.2 OLS Analysis of Revised Agreement

I replicated these regression models for the revised peace agreement on November 24, 2016. Table 6 reports estimates from standard OLS regression models with year-fixed effects and robust standard errors for both algorithms, using standardized variables. Table 7 shows results these models, retaining variables at their original scales. The main findings remain robust for text alignment between citizen proposals and the revised peace agreement.

Table 6: Main OLS Results (November Peace Accord)

	SBERT Similarity				BoW Similarity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.183*** (0.031)		0.193*** (0.031)		0.103** (0.038)		0.126*** (0.032)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.089*** (0.014)		0.081*** (0.014)		0.057*** (0.016)		0.057*** (0.014)
Number of Signatures (std)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.018* (0.009)	-0.051*** (0.009)	-0.035*** (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)
Proposal Length (log, std)	0.475*** (0.012)	0.476*** (0.012)	0.449*** (0.012)	0.450*** (0.012)	0.386*** (0.010)	0.387*** (0.010)	0.342*** (0.010)	0.343*** (0.010)
Thematic Coverage	0.072*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.020)	0.139*** (0.020)	0.139*** (0.020)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.114*** (0.021)	0.139*** (0.020)	0.140*** (0.020)
Endowed Organizations (std)	0.032* (0.015)	0.030* (0.014)	0.044** (0.015)	0.033* (0.014)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.019)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.016)
Observations	8238	8238	8238	8238	8237	8237	8237	8237
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.306	0.306	0.306	0.306

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

Table 7: OLS Results (DV in Original Scale, November Peace Accord)

	SBERT Similarity				BoW Similarity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.017*** (0.003)		0.018*** (0.003)		0.010** (0.004)		0.013*** (0.003)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.018*** (0.003)		0.016*** (0.003)		0.012*** (0.004)		0.012*** (0.003)
Number of Signatures	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Proposal Length	0.088*** (0.002)	0.088*** (0.002)	0.083*** (0.002)	0.084*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.002)	0.079*** (0.002)	0.070*** (0.002)	0.070*** (0.002)
Thematic Coverage	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.002)
Endowed Organizations	0.005* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Observations	8238	8238	8238	8238	8237	8237	8237	8237
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.454	0.306	0.306	0.306	0.306

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

4 Placebo Test

To assess the specificity of the observed associations between rural mobilization and textual similarity, I conduct a placebo test using proposals related to security sector reform. Notably, the 2016 peace agreement did not include any commitments regarding the armed forces or security institutions. As such, there is no substantive basis to expect alignment between citizen demands in this area and the agreement text. I computed lexical and semantic similarity between these proposals and sections of the agreement thematically related to security issues (e.g., points 3 and 6). As shown in Table 8, rural mobilization is not associated with textual similarity at a statistically significant level. These results suggest that the stronger associations observed in the land domain are not merely artifacts of the similarity metric or text length, although some weak alignment in unrelated domains cannot be entirely ruled out.

Table 8: OLS Placebo Models (DV: Security Sector Reform)

	SBERT Similarity				BoW Similarity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rural Movement (Dummy)	0.228 (0.118)		0.216 (0.123)		0.249 (0.191)		0.370* (0.179)	
Rural Movement (Proportion)		0.022 (0.051)		0.027 (0.051)		0.145 (0.079)		0.166* (0.075)
Number of Signatures (std)	0.040 (0.034)	0.057 (0.033)	0.047 (0.037)	0.064 (0.036)	-0.044 (0.054)	-0.024 (0.053)	-0.041 (0.058)	-0.009 (0.057)
Proposal Length (log, std)	0.686*** (0.057)	0.681*** (0.057)	0.693*** (0.056)	0.691*** (0.057)	0.440*** (0.046)	0.441*** (0.047)	0.386*** (0.046)	0.386*** (0.046)
Thematic Coverage	-0.043 (0.093)	-0.038 (0.094)	-0.071 (0.093)	-0.069 (0.094)	-0.052 (0.111)	-0.045 (0.109)	0.069 (0.105)	0.074 (0.104)
Endowed Organizations (std)	0.144** (0.053)	0.073 (0.045)	0.142* (0.058)	0.079 (0.048)	-0.020 (0.098)	-0.008 (0.082)	0.043 (0.093)	0.023 (0.080)
Observations	399	399	399	399	400	400	400	400
Mean of Dependent Variable	0.494	0.494	0.494	0.494	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.260

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Similarity measured via SBERT (M1–M4) and Bag-of-Words (M5–M8).

5 Qualitative Analysis: In-Depth Interviewing and Archival Research

Interviews and archival materials were collected across four waves of fieldwork: June-July 2021, September-November 2022, January-November 2023, and February-April 2024. In-person interviews were held in Bogotá DC, Medellín (Antioquia), Popayán and Inzá (Cauca), Cartagena and María La Baja (Bolívar), Cúcuta and Tibú (Norte de Santander), Bucaramanga (Santander), and Rio Sucio (Chocó).

5.1 Description of Ethics Protocol

Below, I provide my research ethics protocol approved by the Office of Research Compliance (Protocol number 22-11-7517). It was circulated with research participants and archival sites upon first contact. When requested, I explained my research goals and methodological strategy at length to further ensure informed consent from participants.

My name is [anonymized for review] and I am [anonymized for review] at University [anonymized for review]. I am conducting a dissertation project entitled [anonymized for review]. It investigates why wealth redistribution is forged in civil war political transitions despite prior theorizing that expected it to be bargained away. More specifically, it inquires why land redistribution is promised in civil war negotiated settlements and, when addressed in such agreements, why land democratization is achieved at varying degrees at the implementation stage. My dissertation project will explain the nature and content of political commitments on land redistribution found in negotiated settlements and post-transition policies during two civil war, nationwide political transitions in Colombia for the 1982-1994 and 2012-2016 periods. It will also explain the effectiveness and scope of carried-out land redistribution—to wit, policy implementation and subsequent landholding outcomes—across Colombian municipalities for the 2016-2024 period.

I am collecting data on rural-poor mobilization strength and rural-poor movements interactions with peace negotiators (e.g., government and guerrilla negotiators), political

parties, and economic elites through in-depth interviews and archival data collection. Today, I am interested in learning from your experience in these issues given your role in [name of movement / negotiation team / political party / economic elite to which the research participant belongs]. The interview will be around 1.5 hours / I request you access to [name archival data I need to collect] for solely academic purposes.

Please bear in mind that your participation is entirely voluntary. You can decline to respond to any of my questions without being asked why. If you decide not to talk about any topic, please let me know and I will move onto the next question. Also, please remember that you can stop the interview at any time with no penalty. Your answers will remain confidential, and I will not include private information about you in my records or research outputs. I will study the content of our conversation together with the content of several other interviews with other leaders throughout Colombia. I am not recording this interview and, rather, taking notes for merely academic goals.

I do not anticipate costs or any psychological, emotional, physical, social, or legal risks to you related to your participation in this interview. You may find some questions sensitive, but please remember that you can decide not to answer them. In case any risk associated with your involvement in this project emerges, do not hesitate to share with me and I will find the most appropriate ways to address them. While there are no direct benefits to you, you will contribute to a project aimed at enriching our understanding of rural-poor movements' impact on land redistribution committed and carried out in civil war political transitions.

Consent: Do you wish to participate in this project? Please express your willingness to participate by clearly stating yes or no.

5.2 Interview Sample Selection

I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with government and insurgent negotiators and advisors, representatives of social movements, allied organizations such as NGOs, and staff members responsible for facilitating participatory spaces. Interviewees were selected based on their firsthand knowledge and expertise in land grievances and

peace negotiations. Leveraging existing networks, I initiated contact with several interviewees, who subsequently referred me to additional participants, following a snowball sampling method. To address ethnic, racial, and gender disparities in the sample, I actively recruited participants from underrepresented groups. However, the number of women recruited was limited, reflecting gender imbalances in the Havana peace talks, where men predominantly occupied negotiation roles despite efforts to enhance women's representation on both sides to the table.

Given the localized nature of rural mobilization, I selected movement representatives from municipalities directly engaged in protests and high-level negotiations. These high-ranking interviews enabled me to trace the role of rural movements in peace negotiations. Furthermore, my sampling strategy accounted for variation in subnational mobilization strength. Hence, interviewees were primarily drawn from municipalities exhibiting different levels of direct involvement and disruptive actions during the period under study. I also included participants from movements showing diverse ideological perspectives to explore the varying collective action frames used by these actors in articulating their grievances. To ensure anonymity promised to participants, I assigned a code to interviewees. Table 9 lists interviewees' codes, profiles, and the date they were interviewed.

Table 9: In-Depth Interviews List

Code	Interviewee Profile	Date
1	Peasant Movement Leader in Cauca	07/15/2021
2	Peasant Movement Leader in Nariño	07/17/2021
3	Peasant Movement Leader in Cauca	07/28/2021
4	FARC-EP Negotiator	09/05/2022
5	Government Negotiator	09/15/2022
6	Peasant Movement Leader in Cauca	11/08/2022
7	Peasant Movement Leader in Bolívar	11/10/2022
8	Participatory Institutions Staff Member	11/15/2022
9	National Indigenous Movement Leader	11/21/2022
10	National Leftist Political Movement Leader	01/20/2023
11	National Leftist Political Movement Leader	03/14/2023
12	National Peasant Movement Leader	03/01/2023
13	Peasant Movement Leader in Cauca	03/14/2023
14	National Indigenous Movement Leader	03/15/2023
15	National Peasant Movement Leader	03/22/2023
16	FARC-EP Negotiation Advisor	03/24/2023
17	FARC-EP Negotiator	03/25/2023
18	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Catatumbo	03/30/2023
19	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Catatumbo	03/30/2023
20	Government Negotiation Advisor	04/13/2023
21	Mid-Sized Farmer Movement Representative	04/14/2023
22	FARC-EP Negotiator	04/19/2023
23	FARC-EP Negotiator	04/21/2023
24	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Catatumbo	04/27/2023
25	Peasant Movement Leader in Bolívar	04/27/2023

Code	Interviewee Profile	Date
26	FARC-EP Negotiator	05/03/2023
27	Peasant Movement Leader in Meta	05/08/2023
28	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Putumayo	06/07/2023
29	Government Negotiation Advisor	06/20/2023
30	Government Negotiation Advisor	06/21/2023
31	National Indigenous Movement Leader	06/21/2023
32	NGO representative	06/23/2023
33	FARC-EP Negotiation Advisor	06/28/2023
34	Participatory Institutions Staff Member	06/30/2023
35	Participatory Institutions Staff Member	06/30/2023
36	Afro-descendant Movement Peasant Leader in Cauca	07/07/2023
37	Coca-Growing Movement Peasant Leader in Putumayo	07/08/2023
38	Coca-Growing Movement Leader in Putumayo	07/11/2023
39	Peasant Movement Leader in Cauca	07/12/2023
40	National Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader	09/08/2023
41	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Catatumbo	09/23/2023
42	Coca-Growing Peasant Movement Leader in Catatumbo	09/23/2023
43	FARC-EP Negotiation Advisor	09/23/2023
44	National Peasant Movement Leader	09/27/2023
45	Afro-descendant Movement Leader in Chocó	11/15/2023
46	FARC-EP Negotiator	02/13/2024
47	Government Negotiation Advisor	26/03/2024

5.3 Interview Questionnaires

I conducted semi-structured interviews, in-person or online, lasting between 30 minutes and 2 hours. I began interviews with contextual questions and follow up with more in-depth inquiries into the “behind-the-scenes” causal mechanisms relevant to my research, adopting the role of a “provocateur” (Kapiszewski et al., 2015). Below I provide a description of ethics protocol circulated with participants and archival sites to collected

data. I also present versions of questionnaires translated in English since interviews were only conducted in Spanish.

A. Movement Leaders' Questionnaire

1. Background information

- Please tell me about your mobilization trajectory in the movement [name].

2. Movements' strategies and demands

- What demands does your movement primarily raise regarding land issues?
- What significant mobilization events do you recall for your movement's claims-making for land redistribution?
- When do you prefer to go to the streets instead of negotiation spaces? When do you choose to engage with state institutions rather than embarking on protest action?
- What outcomes does your movement achieve through protest action and/or institutional channels?

3. Mobilization before and during peace negotiation

- Could you please tell me more about mobilization during wartime in municipalities where your movement has a foot? What obstacles do you face in mobilization waves at the local level?
- What challenges did your movement face when engaged in mobilization for land redistribution? What spaces did you have to bring about redistributive demands during wartime?
- What changes in obstacles and opportunities for mobilization did you realize once peace negotiation started?

4. Participation in peace negotiations

- The talks between the Colombian State and the former FARC-EP in Havana opened spaces for citizen participation through forums (organized by UNDP

and the National University), written proposals, and delegations. I noted that your movement sent several proposals to the table, especially on rural development, political participation, substitution of illicit crops, and land restitution.

- How did your movement participate in these scenarios?
- What motivated you to do so?
- How did you define who would go to the scenarios?
- How did you decide which issues you would send to the table?
- Were these issues that you were already working on, or did you focus on the points that were included in the peace agreement?
- Was there any aspect of those participation spaces that generated the idea that proposals would find support at the table and beyond the signing of the agreement?
- What benefits do you perceive that your organization had in those participatory spaces (expansion of networks with other movements, echo of political agendas, ideas resonated in the agreement, etc.)?
- What other mobilization strategies did you use to advance your political agenda during the peace negotiation and implementation phase?
- What have been the most significant protests in which you have participated during peace negotiation?
- At what moments do you decide to protest or block roads instead of advocating within institutions (participating in regional forums or sending written proposals to the table)?
- Do you perceive any change in the political landscape after the Havana participatory scenarios? Do you think that this political change has implied that new issues have appeared in the public debate with more strength? Why?

5. Alliances with key actors

- What political allies does your movement join in its quest for land redistribution (e.g., other movements, donors, political parties, insurgent groups)?
- How has your movement forged such alliances? What strategies has your movement envisioned through alliances with key actors?
- To what extent have such alliances increased your movement's success in achieving its purported goals?

B. Government and Insurgent Negotiators and Advisors

1. Background information.

- Could you please introduce yourself to me and tell me more about your trajectory in the negotiation team [name it] at the peace table held between the government and the guerrilla group [name it]?
- What role did you play in advising the signatories on the peace agenda? For how long were you involved in the negotiation team?

2. Peace negotiation.

- How did you build up the content of each point included in the peace agenda to be bargained with the opposing actor at the table?
- Did you follow internal consultation processes to build up your proposal? If so, how did such consultation processes unfold? What actors were involved in those processes? (Place emphasis on land redistribution)
- What outsider actors were critical to building up the proposals introduced to the table by your side?
- How did you create relationships to those actors? (type of actors, objectives of the alliances, places with greater and lesser presence, at what level (emphasis on local vs. national)) (Place emphasis on social movements)
- What strategies did your side employ to persuade the other signatory to agree upon your proposal per agreement points?

- Which issues were crucial for your side to striking an agreement?
- Why and how did you insist in such issues to be addressed at the table?
- What factors do you think help us understand why both sides compromise on land redistribution?

C. Proposal-making forum staff members' Questionnaire

- Background information. Please tell me about your role in running proposal-making forums during peace negotiation.

1. Proposal-making forums' establishment:

- Why did the warring sides establish proposal-making forums during the peace talks if peace negotiation was initially guided by high confidentiality?
- How did they draft the structure and methodology of this novel platform?

2. Forums' objectives and methodology:

- What objectives did proposal-making forums pursue?
- How often were those forums run? What themes could be discussed therein?
- What audiences did those forums target? What strategies did the coordinating team employ to guarantee representation of diverse populations and high participation in those forums?
- How did you collect citizen proposals voiced in forums? What systematizing strategy did you use to compile proposals for the signatories' review?

3. Citizen proposals at the peace table:

- After running forums, how did you communicate citizen proposals to the signatories?
- Which impacts did you see that citizen proposals have on bargaining between the warring sides?
- Do you see any further impact of proposal-making forums on Colombian post-accord politics?

5.4 Interview Analysis: Coding, Saturation, and Consistency

Coding: I promised anonymity to all participants, seeking to ensure a confidential environment where interviewees could speak freely about the influence of unarmed, marginalized actors on peace bargaining. While some elite interviewees might face minimal harm from identity disclosure, I do not reveal identifiable information for any participant, instead using unique IDs. Only interviews with public officials or public figures were recorded. Most interviewees came from marginalized backgrounds and were involved in high-risk activism within a violent context, so I primarily took written notes, which were promptly transcribed after the interviews. Recorded interviews were transcribed using AI software (Whisper), following cybersecurity protocols to guarantee confidentiality.

I transcribed in-depth interviews for comprehensive analysis. Following predefined interview categories, I manually coded excerpts that provided evidence on the theorized effects and causal sequences. I also identified segments that did not align with existing categories, organizing these into new categories as necessary. To ensure the robustness of this coding procedure, I utilized MAXQDA to assess whether the existing categories were exhaustive.

Additionally, I assigned weight scores to each segment, ranging from 0 to 100, based on the extent to which the interview excerpts related to my main research questions. Segments with scores above 60 were retained for their relevance to the research question. I then compared trends across different groups, focusing on similarities and differences in peace negotiation strategies, ideological and instrumental perspectives on land redistribution, and the influence of unarmed actors in the bargaining process. This comparative analysis was extended to social movements to explore their impact on peace negotiations, particularly regarding how and why they shaped the outcomes.

I further compared social movement segments to the results from an LDA model to deepen my understanding of how these movements framed their claims. By manually coding the excerpts as either reparations-based or class-based frames—categories initially identified through LDA topic modeling—I was able to explore the strategic choices

movements made in articulating their grievances. This analysis provided insights into the reasons behind and the methods by which these movements selected specific frames when engaging with warring factions.

Saturation and Consistency of Responses: Although I did not prime interviewees on peace negotiation strategies, stances on land redistribution, or social movement involvement, their responses consistently aligned with the hypothesized effects. Consistency was evident both within and across different profile groups. For within-group comparisons, I assessed consistency among participants by considering their hierarchical positions within each organization. I further ensured consistency by cross-checking interview excerpts from participants holding equivalent positions across different groups. This process allowed me to evaluate the saturation and consistency of responses, thereby increasing my confidence in the findings and the reliability of my reporting.

5.5 Archival Sources

I collected diverse archival materials on peace negotiation, movements' demands, and protest agreements. Most peace negotiation archives were retrieved from the open-source digital archive <https://bapp.com.co/>, assembled by *Fundación Compaz*—a nonprofit founded by former President Santos. To address potential imbalances in data collection, I also gathered undisclosed documents shared by *Partido Comunes*—the FARC-EP successor party. Social movements' documents and protest agreements were collected onsite at movement offices during fieldwork across various municipalities and from institutional archives compiled by *Vivamos Humanos*—a nonprofit founded by former President Samper.

These archives were manually coded based on pre-established categories also used for interviews. This coding procedure was then reviewed in MAXQDA to ensure consistency. I use these documents to complement interview analysis, allowing me to fact check events mentioned in interview excerpts. Table 10 lists out archival sources, document relevant information, and the type of evidence they provide for my analysis.

Table 10: Archival Evidence

Document	Date	Title (in Spanish)	Description	Link / Image
CEDEMA	May 14, 1982	Ley de Reforma Agraria Revolucionaria Promulgada por la Séptima Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP)	Revolutionary agrarian reform bill mandating <i>de facto</i> redistribution from large landowners to landless peasants	Link
UN Peacemaker Archives	March 28, 1984	Acuerdo de la Uribe	Peace accord framework including land reform into the negotiation agenda	Link
FARC-EP Archives	May 6, 1999	Agenda Común por el Cambio Hacia una Nueva Colombia	Peace accord framework including land reform into the negotiation agenda	Figure 5
BAPP	April 9, 2012	Hoja de ruta para la construcción del Acuerdo Marco para la Terminación del Conflicto	Santos' government negotiation document outlining proposed peace agenda	Link
Portafolio	November 12, 2015	Ocho grandes empresarios se reunieron en Cuba con las Farc	Business groups' involvement in peace negotiation	Link
La Silla Vacía	January 23, 2013	Seis razones por las que la propuesta de drogas de las FARC tiene sentido	FARC-EP illicit crop substitution program proposal (version 1)	Link
BAPP	January 1, 2015	Anexo. Cifras de judicialización de campesinos cultivadores	Official statistics on peasant incarcerated for their involvement in illicit crop cultivation	Link
Vivamos Humanos	June 18, 2013	Ante El Pliego del Campesinado del Catatumbo	Press release where local authorities support coca-growing peasant strike	6
El Tiempo	March 16, 2015	Entablan millonaria demanda por perjuicios durante paro del Catatumbo	Oil palm corporations oppose peasant strike in Catatumbo	Link
Fedepalma	June 06, 2013	Levantamiento del bloqueo ilegal en el Catatumbo	Oil palm corporations oppose peasant strike in Catatumbo	Link
Radio Nacional de Colombia	July 19, 2013	'Que no nos crean bobos con zona de reserva campesina de Catatumbo'	Government stigmatizing statements against peasant protest	Link
El Tiempo	June 30, 2013	'Marchas en el Catatumbo están infiltradas por las Farc': Gobierno	Government stigmatizing statements against peasant protest	Link

Document	Date	Title (in Spanish)	Description	Link / Image
Semana	July 9, 2013	ONU pide investigar las muertes en Catatumbo	Outsider support for peasant strikes in Catatumbo	Link
El Tiempo	July 9, 2013	Negociación en el Catatumbo sigue sin mayores avances	Outsider support for peasant strikes in Catatumbo	Link
Vivamos Humanos	August 28, 2013	Estrategia para la post eradicación y fase inicial de la intervención par ala estabilización socio-económica como parte del proceso de sustitución y desarrollo alternativo	Protest agreement	7
Vivamos Humanos	August 11, 2013	Acuerdos entre los gobiernos nacional y departamental de Norte de Santander y la ASCAMCAT para la ejecución inmediata de proyectos de confianza en la región del Catatumbo	Protest agreement	8
Vivamos Humanos	December 11, 2013	Acta Mesa Política del 11 de Diciembre de 2013. Mesa de Interlocución y Acuerdo del Catatumbo	Protest agreement	Figure 9
BAPP	December 16, 2013	Reservado- Acuerdo sobre cultivos de uso ilícito para la Región del Catatumbo	Government assesment of the Catatumbo protest agreements	Link
BAPP	January 14, 2014	Lineamientos básicos para la formulación de un "Programa nacional de sustitución de los usos ilícitos de los cultivos de hoja de coda, amapola o marihuana"	FARC-EP illicit crop substitution program proposal (version 2)	Link
BAPP	December 1, 2013	Talking points punto 4 "solución al problema de las drogas ilícitas"	Government initial stance on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	December 3, 2013	Política anti-drogas para la soberanía y el buen vivir de los pobres del campo	FARC-EP stance on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	December 4, 2013	Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas	Government stance on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	March 6, 2014	Acta N° 16	Negotiation deadlocks on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	March 6, 2014	Rueda de prensa de fin de ciclo. Propuestas de las FARC-EP para abordar el tema solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas	Negotiation deadlock on illicit crop substitution	Link

Document	Date	Title (in Spanish)	Description	Link / Image
BAPP	February 13, 2014	Acta N° 15	Negotiation deadlocks on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	April 8, 2014	Documento de trabajo. Temas pendientes del Punto 4, Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas, y propuestas tanto del Gobierno como de las FARC-EP	Negotiation deadlocks on illicit crop substitution	Link
BAPP	May 12, 2014	Documento de trabajo: Pendientes del Punto 4. Temas pendientes a tratar entre las delegaciones sobre la gradualidad de la erradicación de los cultivos ilícitos, la aspersión aérea, la implementación del PNIS, entre otros	Negotiation deadlocks on illicit crop substitution	Link
BBC Mundo News	May 15, 2015	Colombia suspende uso del polémico pesticida glifosato contra cultivos de coca	Aerial fumigation cessation	Link
BAPP	January 14, 2013	Desarrollo rural para la paz de Colombia. Diez propuestas para una política de desarrollo rural y agrario integral con enfoque territorial	FARC-EP land reform proposal (version 1)	Link
BAPP	March 11, 2013	Listado de temas del Punto 1 ya discutidos, aplazados o que no hacen parte de la Agenda	Government stance on land reform	Link
BAPP	March 21, 2013	Declaración del Jefe de la Delegación del Gobierno Nacional para los diálogos en La Habana, Humberto de la Calle Lombana	Negotiation deadlock on peasant communal land	Link
BAPP	May 22, 2013	Dinámica de la negociación y asuntos no tratados como el latifundio, la minería general y artesanal, el TLC, las ZRC y la soberanía alimentaria, entre otros	Negotiation deadlock on peasant communal land	Link
Revista Semana	March 16, 2013	El lío de las Zonas de Reserva Campesina	Negotiation deadlock on peasant communal land	Link
La Silla Vacía	February 22, 2013	La locomotora minera: A una velocidad para Santos, a otra para los mineros	Government partnership with extractive industries	Link

Document	Date	Title (in Spanish)	Description	Link / Image
United Nations High Commissioner Office in Colombia	July 31, 2013	Reserva Campesina en la Billetera de Timochenko	Government stigmatizing statements against peasant reserve zones	Link
La Silla Vacía	March 21, 2013	La reunión de campesinos que busca llamar la atención de la Habana	Peasant mobilization for the enhancement of peasant reserve zones	Link
Nuevo Siglo	March 14, 2013	Farc busca que otorguen 9 millones de hectáreas	FARC stance on peasant reserve zones	Link
La Silla Vacía	August 28, 2013	El Paro Agrario versión Bogotá	National agrarian strike	Link
La Silla Vacía	August 26, 2013	Al negar el paro, Santos le echa más gasolina al fuego	Government missteps in addressing rural protest	Link
La Silla Vacía	May 13, 2014	La fórmula para desactivar el paro: un complemento a La Habana	Government preemptive response to hamper rural mobilization	Link

Figure 5: 1999 FARC-EP Shared Agenda for Change

AGENDA COMUN POR EL CAMBIO HACIA UNA NUEVA COLOMBIA

1. SOLUCION POLITICA NEGOCIADA

Se buscará una solución política al grave conflicto social y armado que conduzca hacia una nueva Colombia, por medio de las transformaciones políticas, económicas y sociales que permitan consensos para la construcción de un nuevo Estado fundamentado en la justicia social, conservando la unidad nacional.

En la medida en que se avance en la negociación, se producirán hechos de paz. De ahí, el compromiso que debemos asumir todos los colombianos con la construcción de la paz, sin distinción de partidos, intereses económicos, sociales o religiosos.

2. PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS COMO RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO

- 2.1 Derechos fundamentales
- 2.2 Derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y del ambiente
- 2.3 Tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos

3. POLITICA AGRARIA INTEGRAL

- 3.1 Democratización del crédito, asistencia técnica, mercadeo
- 3.2 Redistribución de la tierra improductiva
- 3.3 Recuperación y distribución de la tierra adquirida a través del narcotráfico y/o enriquecimiento ilícito
- 3.4 Estímulos a la producción
- 3.5 Ordenamiento territorial integral
- 3.6 Sustitución de cultivos ilícitos y desarrollo alternativo

4. EXPLOTACION Y CONSERVACION DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES

- 4.1 Recursos Naturales y su distribución
- 4.2 Tratados internacionales
- 4.3 Protección del ambiente sobre la base del desarrollo sostenible

5. ESTRUCTURA ECONOMICA Y SOCIAL

- 5.1 Revisión del modelo de desarrollo económico
- 5.2 Políticas de redistribución del ingreso
- 5.3 Ampliación de mercados internos y externos
- 5.4 Estímulos a la producción a través de la pequeña, mediana y gran empresa privada
- 5.5 Apoyo a la economía solidaria y cooperativa
- 5.6 Estímulo a la inversión extranjera que beneficie a la Nación
- 5.7 Participación social en la planeación
- 5.8 Inversiones en bienestar social, educación e investigación científica

6. REFORMAS A LA JUSTICIA , LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCION Y EL NARCOTRAFICO

- 6.1 Sistema judicial
- 6.2 ~~Organos~~ Organos de control
- 6.3 Instrumentos de lucha contra la corrupción
- 6.4 Narcotráfico

7. REFORMA POLITICA PARA LA AMPLIACION DE LA DEMOCRACIA

Figure 6: Press release




Figure 7: Protest agreements in Catatumbo




Figure 8: Protest agreements in Catatumbo

1

REUNIÓN COMISIÓN DE GOBIERNO Y ASOCIACIÓN CAMPESINA DEL CATATUMBO

San José de Cúcuta, 9 de Agosto de 2013

ACUERDO SOBRE EL TEMA DE GARANTIAS:

El Gobierno Nacional y los campesinos del Catatumbo están plenamente de acuerdo en el respeto a los principios consagrados en la constitución política de Colombia tales como el Estado Social de Derecho, la sujeción al ordenamiento jurídico, el rechazo a todas las formas de violencia.

Igualmente, reconocen la importancia del respeto y garantía de los derechos fundamentales tales como el debido proceso y la libertad de locomoción de los ciudadanos colombianos.

Con base en estos argumentos, las partes acuerdan:

1. Solicitar una Agencia Especial, por parte del Ministerio Público (Procuraduría General de la Nación y Defensoría del Pueblo): para el acompañamiento a las investigaciones penales abiertas, así como la garantía del derecho a la defensa técnica, con ocasión de los hechos ocurridos en el Catatumbo entre el 10 de junio y el 3 de agosto de 2013, en el marco de las manifestaciones campesinas y bloqueos.
2. Elevar una solicitud la Fiscalía General de la Nación para impulsar los procesos de quienes están siendo investigados por la posible comisión de delitos en el marco de los hechos ocurridos durante las manifestaciones campesinas y bloqueos del Catatumbo entre el 10 de junio y el 3 de agosto de 2013, y además propiciar un espacio de dialogo con el Fiscal General de la Nación.
3. El Gobierno Nacional reconoce y respeta los derechos de asociación, opinión, libertad de expresión y participación de la Asociación Campesina del Catatumbo y de los campesinos del Catatumbo, bajo el cumplimiento del ordenamiento legal vigente.

Figure 9: Protest agreements in Catatumbo

**Acta Mesa Política 11 de Diciembre de 2013
Mesa de Interlocución y Acuerdo del Catatumbo**

En San José de Cúcuta el 11 de diciembre de 2013 participaron en la sesión de la mesa política delegados y delegadas del Gobierno Nacional (Sub-Directora DPS, Viceministro de Desarrollo Rural- Ministerio de Agricultura, , Viceministro de Aguas del Ministerio de Vivienda, Gerente General del INCODER, Mininterior y DNP), Ascamcat y PNUD. Se desarrolló el siguiente orden del día:

1. Socialización de Investigación - Servicio Geológico Colombiano
2. Participación de Ascamcat - Mapeo de Actores
3. Acuerdos de Confianza-Agricultura-IPDR
4. Ordenamiento Territorial - ZRC
5. Garantías

Al tratarse de la última sesión del año se espera avanzar de manera contundente en los temas planteados en la agenda. Asimismo, el Gobierno rechaza los hostigamientos que han tenido los voceros de Ascamcat los últimos días. Se espera que en el espacio de garantías se realice un balance sobre la reunión de la UNP.

1. Socialización de Investigación - Servicio Geológico Colombiano

El Servicio Geológico Colombiano realiza la presentación del Proyecto de Investigación Científica, cuyo objetivo es desarrollar procesos científicos de mapeo y cartografía geológica.

2. Participación Ascamcat - Mapeo de Actores

De acuerdo a la necesidad planteada por Ascamcat de contar con pronunciamiento del Gobierno frente al documento del Padre De Roux sobre la iniciativa de paz, se expone la posición del Gobierno Nacional al respecto. **Se resalta la necesidad de contar con un espacio amplio, que incluya la mayor cantidad actores. Se entrega por medio electrónico la posición del Gobierno y queda establecido que en reunión con garantes se discutirá el tema.**

Ascamcat expresa nuevamente su inconformidad por lo sucedido en el ejercicio de mapeo de actores y la discusión de la mesa técnica de la semana pasada. El Gobierno Nacional reitera el reconocimiento y la legitimidad de Ascamcat, así como de las organizaciones sociales del territorio. Se trata de un pronunciamiento desafortunado, pero no corresponde a la posición del Gobierno y de ningún vocero, y en tal sentido se han tomado medidas correctivas.

References

- Grimmer, J., M. E. Roberts, and B. M. Stewart (2022, March). *Text as data*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kapiszewski, D., L. M. MacLean, and B. L. Read (2015, January). *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles*. Cambridge University Press.
- Reimers, N. and I. Gurevych (2019). Sentence-bert: Sentence embeddings using siamese bert-networks.